Exhibit A - 7. A retype of a paper. Note by GAS in 1990: written in July or August of 1977 to assist the old office. Jack Wessel made it an enclosure to a memo he prepared.

POINT PAPER

Subject: Weapon Acquisition Cycle - Overview

Ref:
(a)DDR&E memo dated 10 Jun 1977 to Secs. Mil. Depts.
(b)CNM letter to NAVAIR Mat-09H/LTS dated 5 Jul 1977

Encl:
(1) Chart - VF Schedules (F-8, F-4, F80-3, F-14, F18)
(2) Chart - VF Timing - Deliveries vs. elapsed time
(3) Chart - Comparison Schedules - CH-53A and CH-53E

1. Reference (a) informed the services that, as a result of Congressional criticism, the Defense Science Board (DSB) had been asked, as a part of their two week Summer Study, to examine the "Impact on DOD of the Increasing Length of the Acquisition Cycle" and make practical recommendations on how to shorten the cycle without greatly increasing the risk. Reference (b) requested data on a number of aircraft programs which in turn had been requested by the Air/CounterAir Team of the DSB Task Force. This paper will attempt to supplement the detailed information with more generalized observations on past and present naval aircraft acquisition practices.
2. The first point which needs to be considered is probably the degree to which the Congressional criticisms, mentioned in reference (a), are valid as regards the lengthening of the acquisition cycle. The detailed program information being furnished the DSB will demonstrate that the cycle has generally lengthened, although the true extent of the problem may not be readily apparent since no naval aircraft program to date has followed all the policies of DOD Directive 5000.1 and OMB Circular A-109 as they are being implemented. Also to be considered is the fact that direct comparison of aircraft programs may be misleading due to the differing circumstances almost invariably involve in each one. For example, the F-4 program is not representative of a "normal" fighter development of its era due to a premature start for political or industrial mobilization reasons, a reconfiguration, engine changes, and finally a competitive decision period, dictated by Congress, following which the highly successful F8U-3 program was terminated. The F-8 (originally F8U-1 ) program was more nearly representative of a properly programmed development of the 1950s. It was scheduled in accordance with the Navy's newly evolved Fleet Introduction of Replacement Models (FIRM) plan, which held production at a low rate while adequate test time was accumulated, insuring against major retrofit changes. The same basic plan has been followed ever since when the Navy was permitted freedom of choice in structuring a development schedule. Enclosure (1) shows graphically the comparative schedules of the Navy fighters, F-8,
   F-4, F8U-3, F-14, and F-18, with each starting at initiation of full scale development of the configuration. The cycle shown for the F-18 is seen to have the longest period from first flight to a production build-up of any of the models, approximately three years. There is no Navy experience with a program stretched out to this extent, which even then ignores the prototype program which preceded the development, and which has been required in recent years.
3. Enclosure (2) is a plot of various fighter deliveries as a function of time after program go-ahead, which also illustrates the differences in scheduling. In addition to the models noted in enclosure (1), the older F4U-1 and F8F-1 programs are shown. The following points should be noted:
1. The F4U-1 was the last fighter design to reach the fleet via a fly-before-buy prototype program. The production airplane design was started after flight tests of the experimental model, with deliveries building up at a very rapid rate, despite incorporation of fairly major changes. Wartime needs undoubtedly contributed to this schedule.
2. The F8F-1 illustrates what could be done with a maximum effort program designed for production from the outset. Build-up was also rapid, but less so than for the production phase of the F4U-1. The two-year shorter time span from initiation to fleet use, as compared to the F4U-1 is obvious. The success of concurrent programs such as this was the reason the fly-before-buy concept was abandoned.
3. A decade later, the F-8 (then F8U-1) development showed how the concurrent type of program had evolved to slow down the production build-up. Fleet use about 1 ½ years later than for a maximum effort, such as the F8F-1, was a result, but this was still at least two years earlier than possible using a prototype approach followed by a reasonable production schedule.
4. The F-14 proceeded somewhat less expeditiously than the F-8 primarily due to funding limitations. Minimum option quantities, half of the planned rate, were ordered following the initial test airplane lots.
5. As mentioned earlier, the F-4 program is not really a representative schedule. It suffered from too early a start relative to its engines and weapons system. Despite the length of the program, it produced a larger number of non-deployable aircraft than any of the other models shown.
6. The F-18 is seen to have the longest cycle of any of the aircraft, at the 60^th delivery, it is a year behind the F-4, two years behind the F-14, and over three years behind the F-8. From a pure airplane viewpoint, it is certainly less of an unknown than was the F-8 in 1953, as both its engine and weapon system developments are relatively less advanced.
4. One of the clearest examples of the difference between previous and current acquisition practices is illustrated in enclosure (3), which compares the schedules of the CH-53A and the CH-53E. The CH-53A represented fully as great a development challenge when it was started in 1963 as did the CH-53E when it was finally approved as a modified fly-before-buy program 8 years later. On a relative basis, the CH-53E acquisition process produces its 36^th helicopter some 5 years later than did the CH-53A. Also noted is the four year delay suffered in starting the program by ill conceived attempts at the OSD level to merge the program with its Army counterpart, the HLH. The two types of delay add up to a nine year period, depriving the Marines of a needed capability, and at least doubling the price of the program.
5. The fighter schedule comparisons already drawn ignore the time required for a "competitive alternative concepts" stage as well as the "competitive demonstration and validation" stages. When these are considered realistically, the total impact on the acquisition cycle would seem to be about five to seven years, broken down as follows:
1. Conceptual stage, formerly on the order of a year from an "Operational Requirement" to an RFP for full scale development, probably on the order of two years from a "Mission need Statement" to the RFP for the competitive validation exercise.
2. Validation, or prototype stage, formerly not used, would consume about 2-3 years, including decision time.
3. Actual engineering development cycle extended by approximately 2-3 years to allow for more testing prior to full scale production.

The cost impact of these acquisition practices is obviously great. To date, prototyping costs have been partially hidden as the contractors have engaged in both "buy-ins" and in cost sharing. Introducing competitiveness into the conceptual phase, previously largely unfunded, also has some financial implication. It would appear that the inflationary cost impact would have to be about 30-40%, while inefficiencies associated with very low rate production plus the competitive prototyping increment would raise the total impact to more than 50% over what were formerly considered reasonable acquisition practices; which produced at least a generation of highly successful aircraft.

6. The reasons for the changes in the methods by which naval aircraft were procured deserves some discussion. Until about 1960, the acquisition process was determined almost entirely by the procuring agency, BuAer/BuWeps, although within the policies established by the Armed Service Procurement Regulations (ASPR). When problems occurred within the developmental process, changes were made to minimize their chances for recurrence. No compromises were necessary to meet the practices of other parts of the Navy, or those employed by the other services, or other departments of the government. Since 1960 there has been more and more pressure applied to standardize first all military procurement practices and more recently, all federal practices, as well. Simultaneously, layers of authority have been added, and most decisions on major system acquisitions and procurement procedures have been elevated several levels. Management decisions once made routinely at the project level now sometimes reach SECDEF. With more management personnel assigned at all levels, it is perhaps not surprising that more and more changes are made in the acquisition process in the name of improving management control. The need of these imposed controls has seldom been apparent to those engineering and procurement personnel directly involved. Few, if any, of the changes made in the process since 1960 were analyzed for overall cost effectiveness. Prototyping, for example, was reintroduced despite the fact that the services had dropped the concept because of time and cost considerations for all projects considered predictable. At today's state-of-the-art, most designs proposed by the services are in this category. The great emphasis in recent years on the necessity for operational testing prior to a production commitment is another example of a control imposed without proof of cost effectiveness, as is the oft demanded separation of developmental and operational testing. Although the theory of separating development and testing may sound attractive, the necessity for it was never apparent in naval aviation, and probably in no other branch of the service where one's survival could depend on the quality of the product.
7. In naval aviation, at least, the need for all the controls now being exercised over the acquisition process has never been demonstrated. The DSARCs and now (N)SARCs which precede them, are actually duplicative of the very real control exercised in the budget process. That control has always existed, and is today tighter than ever. The obstacles through the departments, OSD, OMB, and at least four Congressional Committees should be more than adequate.
8. If a solution to the problem of a lengthened acquisition cycle is really wanted, it is readily apparent that one only has to return to the procedures and organizations in existence when the cycle was of acceptable length. The naval aircraft produced, while far from perfect, were certainly of an acceptable quality, and were produced in a timely fashion. They could be again, if freedom to do the job properly were delegated in its entirety to the procuring agency.