Exhibit A-8. A retyped memorandum.

30 August 1974

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Multi-Service Aircraft Procurements

1. The leadership of the DOD is again attempting to bring a multi-service airplane project into being, in the name of economy, by forcing an Air Force design into a Navy mold. To date, the record of the OSD in such attempts has been anything but impressive with the next success being the first. It is clear to those who have lived through the past fiascoes that the current attempt to force a carrier version of the Air Force's light weight fighter on the Navy is also doomed to failure. In every case, the decisions to initiate the unsuccessful projects have been based on data generated within OSD which are at variance with the true facts. The decision makers should not have to contend with this type of problem, yet its incidence is high enough that its presence must be recognized.



2. Information available on the YF-16, YF-17 and their production versions, which will be designed to meet Air Force "ACF" requirements, is inadequate for performing a detail evaluation of weight, performance, schedule and cost such as was done last year on the F-15N. Lacking such information a conclusion on the merits of the proposition could be reached by comparing the current situation with past attempts to achieve economy via the multi-service route, and by analyzing the accuracy of predictions of the various organizations involved. Multi-service usage of aircraft is obviously a different problem than multi-service development. There are many examples of success in the former, and few in the latter. Possibility of success also varies with whether carrier or other shipboard constraints are involved, and the degree to which they penalize the land based model. The past attempts at joint development with shipboard constraints are discussed below:



1. TFX/F-111 -- This project was initiated by SecDef to save one billion dollars by combining an Air Force tactical fighter requirement with a Navy general purpose fighter requirement after cancelling a Navy fleet air defense project (Eagle-Missileer). The Navy and Air Force advised SecDef that no single airplane could meet a combined requirements, but the OSD staff concluded that it could. The saving was converted into a loss of about the same magnitude, the Navy deprived of an F-4 replacement for about a decade, while the Air Force design was also delayed and was less suitable than it might have been. Congress finally had to kill the effort. The culpability can be traced to poor analysis of widely differing designs by OSD staff in the spring of 1961, followed by gross technical over optimism in August of 1961 by the same staff. After the decision to proceed was made, OSD and Air Force over optimism combined to confuse the decision maker during the source selection and development process. The program was Air Force managed from its inception.



2. Tri-Service Transport (XC-142) -- This joint venture was initiated when an ad hoc study group reported to OSD that it was feasible to build a VTOL transport to meet the needs of the Marines, Army, and Air Force. The Navy, although it had disagreed with the conclusion, was assigned management responsibility, and like the Air Force in the TFX case, attempted to meet the directed goal. After a design competition and three service evaluations, the Navy reported to OSD that no single design could approach the combined requirements of the individual services, and recommended dropping the project in favor of smaller individual research programs. The Air Force and Army opted for continuance pursuant to OSD desires. The Navy was allowed to withdraw. Eliminating shipboard size constraints then permitted the project to proceed toward the less impossible goal of satisfying Army and Air Force requirements under Air Force management. Eventually five XC-142s were produced and tested. Since the original payload goal was not achieved by a wide margin, production was not undertaken. The Navy was permitted to fill the original Marine requirement by developing the CH-53 helicopter independently. The Air Force later purchased the design in a rescue configuration in production quantities. Joint development failed, but a joint usage eventually resulted on a different project.



3. HLH/CH-53E -- On the advice of OSD staff, the DepSecDef made a decision in 1970 to combine a Marine requirement for a crane type heavy lift helicopter with an Army requirement. Due to specification differences in environmental conditions, the apparent compromise to achieve standardization was between a Marine "18T" capability and Army "23T." In gross weight and real size, however, the difference was at least 1:2. The army design, as first defined, could operate from no Navy ships, and as later compromised, with difficulty from but a single class of vessels then under development. On reclama, the decision to continue the joint development was made subject to review after an industry wide competition. The competition designs were in almost exact agreement with Army/Navy estimates made in 1970, leading to the decision in late 1971 to allow separate developments. Delays in the CH-53E program all at the OSD level, have doubled the cost of that program to the Marines, while the Army is still struggling under an OSD directive to preserve some degree of shipboard compatibility in their HLH design.





3. Joint development on designs with no shipboard constraints included.



1. Light Observation/OV-1 -- The project started as a joint development to meet Army/Marine requirements for an observation and spotting airplane to replace OE-1s. Under Navy management, with Army project personnel assisting, the design was a success, but the Marines withdrew from the production program in order to use their funds for a completely different purpose (C-130s). The Army eventually took over cognizance of the program after several years of production. Started as joint development, it ended up as a single service project.



2. COIN/OV-10 -- This program was started within OSD by combining a preliminary Marine requirement with a number of others including use as a utility transport in South America. Technical goals were overstated, and cost goals drastically understated. After much negotiation, the project was assigned to the Navy as a joint Army-Navy-Air Force program. Eventually, a usable airplane was developed, although the OSD goals were not approached, and even Navy estimates not realized. The Marines and Air Force have used it in small numbers as a spotting aircraft (FAC) and in a light attack role. There were no shipboard constraints in this case, and the OSD imposed utility requirements penalized all services equally. The OSD production goal of 500 aircraft has not been approached. An airplane designed to meet the Marine mission alone would have been cheaper and equally as useful to the other services for their missions.



4. Joint usage by other services of designs developed initially with shipboard constraints show a total record of success, as might be expected, since no service would buy an unusable design even under heavy pressure from standardization or economy advocates. The successful projects in this category include:



1. A-7 - At the time of the early TFX decision, a companion project, VAX, was under consideration as a multi-service light attack airplane for use by the Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Army. Eventually, the latter two were allowed to withdraw, since the Air Force desired a TFX type of capability for its attack aircraft, and the Army demanded a high speed helicopter. The requirements were so diverse that normal development of the A-7 was permitted as an A-4 replacement by the Navy. The airplane was an outstanding success, meeting its development goals of cost, schedule, and performance. The Marines, however, continued to buy A-4s due to its lower cost and their lesser range/payload requirement. OSD forced the Air Force to complement its F-111 force by purchasing A-7 airplanes, a lower cost alternative. The Air Force required more thrust and developed the TF-41 engine to meet its needs, and collaborated with the Navy in developing the A-7D/E weapons system capability. The design started as a carrier based airplane, and has remained under Navy management. Air Force models while successfully employed, have never been accepted with enthusiasm by that service due probably to their subsonic performance and lack of a fighter capability as desired by TAC.



2. F-4 - The airplane started and existed for a number of years as a standard Navy/Marine carrier based fighter airplane. The Air Force had developed the F-105 as its contemporary strike fighter, In a standardization/economy move, the Air Force was forced into evaluating the two designs, after which the F-105 production was terminated. The F-4 simply proved to be a better airplane despite its built in shipboard penalties, many of which the Air Force eventually phased out, as they phased in modifications to meet their requirements. Major Air Force modifications initially included a change in the fire control system to improve air/ground capability, an internal gun, controls in the rear cockpit, and larger wheels and tires. The airplane remained under Navy management until after Navy production ceased. Air Force and foreign sales were much greater than those to the Navy/Marines.



3. A-3/B-66 -- The carrier based A-3 was adapted to use by the Air Force first as a medium bomber and then in an electronic countermeasures role and purchased in reasonably large quantities. Significant changes in the airplane were made including a change from J57 to J71 engines. The Air Force purchase was managed by the Air Force after the Navy had run the entire development and its production program.



4. A-1 -- The Air Force used large numbers of A-1 airplanes in the ground support role in SEA long after their production as Navy carrier based attack airplanes had ceased. This was simply a case of a service employing the best available product to do a job.



5. H-3, H-53, H-37, H-19, etc. -- Variants of these helicopters, designed initially for shipboard use have been produced and used successfully by the Air Force and/or Army.





5. The only successful conversion from land to a carrier based design in modern times was a modification of the F-86 to the FJ series. The airplane was purchased initially because of its outstanding fighter record with the Air Force, and its apparent superiority over the then available F9F and F2H series designs. In its finally modified form, it was virtually a new airplane, which became a competitor for the A-4 in the light attack role. The project, while a technical success, would not have passed today's tests of cost effectiveness, as the required modifications made it more costly than the fighters it was supplementing. Nearly every Air Force tactical airplane design in history has been offered to the Navy in a carrier version, but few survived the paper stage, and no other combat type reached production. Possibly the Harrier should be included in this category, although, as a VTOL, shipboard use required no significant penalty.



6. Joint usage of land based types among the services has been extensive, particularly among non combat types. Most of the trainers, transports, and helicopters developed by one service, or commercially, have been used by others. Something over 50 models fall in this category.




7. From the above, it should be quite obvious that the Navy has taken advantage of development by others when it has made sense to do so. None of the programs forced on the Navy in standardization or economy efforts has met Navy expectations, and none has approached the more optimistic projections of the OSD proponents. It is an unfortunate fact of life that few of those optimists remain in their positions long enough to accept responsibility for their actions.




8. In the current situation, the probability of ultimate success in adapting the Air Force light weight fighter to naval use is even more remote than normal. This is due to the fact that the capability of the present flying models is well below the level now contemplated for the VFAX, which in turn is well below a level representative of a combination of the F-4 and A-7 characteristics. The obvious implication is that the weight growth, and degree of required modification, will be greater than for a more normal case such as modifying the F-15 to a Navy version. Since that degree of change has proved too great in the past to effect cost savings, no hope for YF-16/17 to VFAX should be entertained.




9. While the change from a land based to a carrier based design involves major changes, the reverse is not true, since the Air Force can invariably operate a Navy carrier design as produced. From a practical standpoint, it is really an irreversible process. However, it must be realized that the performance of the carrier based design should always be inferior to the airplane which is designed without the carrier penalties. Whether this edge of advantage can be sacrificed is questionable particularly when one is competing with a minimum capability weapon system against an enemy who already has an easier design problem.




10. Careful, detailed cost and effectiveness studies should be made before either service is forced into the high/low capability morass, or before either service is forced into using the basic design of the other. There is little evidence that the actions being planned can help our defense posture, while the lessons of history indicate strongly that it will suffer further degradation.
    

/s/

G. A. Spangenberg

Note: This memorandum has been prepared with no great amount of research, and I may have missed a few examples of joint usage, but I believe I've included all joint airplane developments in the last 25 years.

Copy to:

AIR-506
AIR-05
PMA-265
AIR-00
OP-05
CNM
TACAIR