Exhibit V-1. A retyped memo

                                                                                                           26 January 1977

MEMORANDUM

From: G. A. Spangenberg

To:Radm. C. P. Ekas, Jr.

Subj:XFV-12A Review

 Encl:
(1) Folder: XFV-12A Program Initiation
(2) Chart: XFV-12A Recap - Performance Estimates

1. In a discussion on 19 January 1977, I agreed to put together, on an informal basis, some of the early history of the thrust augmented wing project and to review with some of the NavAir engineers the current outlook for the program producing a fleet aircraft.


2. For the record, it must be noted that in 1971 - 1972 I opposed the entire "Prototype (with a capital P)" program as sponsored by DDR&E, the Navy's implementation of that program in general, and the XFV-12A project in particular. There are few who will consider me unbiased on the subject.
 

3. Enclosure (1) has been assembled from correspondence available in AIR-506 files, and, while by no means complete, is intended to show that the program was initiated by means well outside those employed by NavAir in its highly successful normal development and procurement process. Most of the lessons of history were ignored by those who attempted what they believed to be innovative approaches to defense procurement, but which in fact had all been discarded in the evolution of the naval aircraft acquisition process. Another factor involved in the early years of the program, and one which has been a recurrent problem within my experience, is a belief that the engineers who produce NavAir estimates are congenitally overly conservative, while contractor technical estimates can be achieved if adequate management attention is applied. This belief, as you know, was a major factor in the TFX debacle.
 

4. The merit of a prototype development program can best be judged by the quality of the service product which follows. To the best of my knowledge, no naval aircraft development prior to the XFV-12A had ever been started unless the end product was predicted to be an effective weapon. However, in this case, the service configuration of the thrust augmented wing fighter was predicted by NavAir to have no capability, yet the prototype development was initiated presumably on the basis of the claims by the contractor. Contributing to the problem was the fact that the initial proposals, limited to 20 pages, contained inadequate information for a normal evaluation, and time constraints were imposed which prevented one, even if the data had been available. Also involved was the fact that two aircraft configurations, the prototype and a service model, had to be considered since substantial weight differences were involved. Enclosure (2) recaps some of the weight and performance predictions over the course of the program. From this tabulation, it can be concluded that there is no possibility of a fleet V/STOL fighter emerging from the program. Note that with the same engine rating, the maximum vertical take off gross weight is the same for both "prototype" and "service" models, while the difference in empty weight and equipment is approximately the same between the two models. The DLI fighter radius can be used as an indicator of capability. On the first Navy check of the design, in 1972, the service model had no capability with approximately 5000 lb. discrepancies between the contractor and Navy estimates of both weight and lift force. Later the differences in lift capability were reduced by eliminating suck down and reingestion effects and increasing the engine rating used. Navy estimates of a future fighter capability peaked at about the end of 1973 when it was estimated that a small amount of fuel could be lifted off in addition to fighter armament, giving a slightly positive radius of action. Since that time it will be observed that the vertical take off gross weight has decreased by about 3000 lb. which would eliminate the fuel allowance, again achieving no capability.
 

5. In my opinion, there is no need to examine the program in detail when the general conclusion is so apparent. I have found no one in NavAir who believes that a useful fighter can be derived from the program, although nearly all favor continuing the project to obtain actual full scale data. Although I can understand the sentiment, there must be more productive projects available.
 

6. If a supersonic V/STOL fighter capability is required, it is probable that the lift plus lift cruise configuration is still the most promising. Although some object to carrying the so called dead weight of the lift engines into combat, the fact is that that weight is small compared to the weight penalties associated with the thrust augmented wing. The latter has been estimated to have the poorest T/W ratio for any of the V/STOL propulsion arrangements which have been studied in recent years. As was the case five years ago, however, new lift engine development must precede any
   L + LC aircraft development.
 

7. It is clear that the XFV-12A program will not enhance the image of naval aviation. Note that in this case the outcome was not only predictable, but was in fact predicted. As is so often the case, all of the principals in the decision have moved on in both OSD and the Navy. The task of justification will fall on others and will be difficult. It is to be hoped that the same mistakes will not be made again, although the entire V/STOL program certainly has the potential.

                                                                                      /s/

                                                                                      G. A. Spangenberg