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Exhibit V-2. A Retyped paper


Model XFV-12A - PROGRAM HISTORY (1971 -72)

  1. In 1971, OSD initiated a "Prototype" program. In brief, the program was intended to produce more competitive hardware with less bureaucratic control, reduce costs, and give SecDef more program options. "Requirements", and "Specifications" were to be avoided and innovative approaches encouraged. In the words of one DDR&E official the Air Force enthusiastically supported the program, while the Army and Navy were reluctantly brought aboard. Mat-03 (Vadm. Davies) was the head Navy Prototyper. Some support for the program existed in all segments of DOD by those who believed that "Prototype" funds would be in addition to the normal R&D budget. The more realistic officials recognized that any "added funding" would be small and limited to that one budget.


  2. In this same time period, a small "Sea Control Ship" (SCS) concept was being studied with strong support and direction by the CNO (Adm. Zumwalt). The SCS was not well defined, but was known by all to require V/STOL aircraft since there were to be no catapults nor arresting gear.


  3. Projects suggested for inclusion in the Prototype program by NavAir were really those which had been inadequately funded in the normal R&D budget, as for example, the COD version of the S-3A. Such projects were not well received. MAT-03 then elected to solicit industry directly for innovative proposals for two general types of aircraft to be based on the SCS, fighter/attack and long endurance sensor carriers. The solicitation was also published in the Commerce Business Daily. (Tab 1). Proposals were to be limited to 20 pages and delivered to the MAT-03 Prototype office.


  4. NavAir was tasked to evaluate the submissions and report back to MAT-03 in about two weeks. Tab (2) is the NavAir memo outlining the evaluation task to those divisions who would participate, while Tab (3) gives additional guidance.


  5. The evaluation was reported to MAT-03 on 19 January 1972 in a briefing using the charts attached as Tab (4), and later reduced to writing by memorandum, Tab (5). It was recommended in the fighter/attack category that a lift engine be started at once as well as a suitable radar and fire control system. After the SCS missions had been established a competition for a V/STOL fighter was recommended. In the sensor area, one of the recommendations was to start work on the North American sensor carrier prototype. (This was essentially a flying test bed using the OV-10 as a vehicle.)


  6. Following the NavAir briefing to MAT-03 on 19 January, the latter revised the briefing and carried forward a recommendation to start the North American thrust augmented wing fighter/attack. Copies of the charts used in that briefing are not available in AIR-506, but some insight into the presentation is available from comments made on some CNO originated correspondence. Tab (6).


  7. As more data became available on the North American fighter/attack design (NR-356), evaluation efforts were continued in the primary areas of weight and performance. Tab (7) indicates that a serious weight problem was apparent on the first full estimate.


  8. On 1 March 1972, AIR-530 reported on further evaluation efforts. At that time, the combined discrepancy between contractor and NavAir estimates of weight and lift was 9800 lb. Tab (8). Although all calculations were based on a meager data base, the magnitude of the differences was unprecedented.


  9. Nearly all the dissent to the program existed within the NavAir technical community, and was kept from the higher decision making levels in the Navy, and OSD. Tab (9) reports on a meeting with ASN (R&D) which was called because of that problem. Also discussed were items relating to the prototype program, and the SCS. It appeared then the augmented wing proposal would be restructured to make it more suitable as a technology base, instead of as a prototype for a new fighter.


  10. Despite the technical projections, the project was continued. The Light Weight Fighter Study, (an outgrowth of the older Fighter Study efforts in OpNav which had provided the justification for the F-14) reached the draft stage presenting results which were quite controversial. Tab (10) is one of the memos commenting on that draft. Reference to the study is included here because it provided the base on which much of the over-optimism associated with the V/STOL program has grown.


  11. Tab (11) is a DDR&E memo which forwarded a draft Program Memorandum (PM) to ASN (R&D) for use in preparing a final copy. The facts, rationale, and program plans are based on the contractor's proposal with no consideration given to the Navy's own technical estimates.


  12. In a memo dated 5 May, Tab (12) comments on the PM as approved by ASN (R&D). All technical objections to the project had been ignored.


  13. On 8 May 1972, based on further design data, a new Navy weight estimate was reported, in comparison with NASA, Langley, and NADC estimates. Tab (13).


  14. On 11 May 1972, AIR-506 summarized his objections to the Prototype program to clarify issues being raised in NavMat and OpNav. Tab (14).


  15. On 23 June 1972, a summary of the weight situation on both the prototype and service versions of the TAW design was presented. The lack of a potential for fleet use was restated. Tab(15)


  16. On 7 July, Mr. Paglianete of AIR-530 reported in greater detail on the technical status of the TAW project and included a trip report by Mr. Weissman of OP-098. Tab(16).


  17. On 12 July 1972, CNO directed the CNM to establish a Prototype Development Manager in NavAir. Tab(17).


  18. On 26 July, CNO directed initiation of an effort to define characteristics and costs of V/STOL aircraft for the SCS. Tab(18)


  19. In June and July 1972 NavAir conducted an informal competition for V/STOL VFA aircraft to meet tentative requirements established by CNO. Most of the designs were lift plus lift cruise. Tab (19) is the "Conclusions" chart of the presentation winding up the competition.


  20. A letter was prepared on 30 August 1972 outlining the reasons why comparable cost information could not be provided on production versions of a number of V/STOL models including the TAW. The letter was not forwarded. Tab (20).


  21. A criticism of the data planned for a Pre-CEB was prepared in October 1972. OP-098 later reported that changes had been made identifying the TAW as a high risk program with no production cost figures presented. Tab (21).


  22. At the end of the period noted in this folder, the XFV-12A program was well established. Plans for a formal program review to be held in January 1973 were underway. NAVAIR continued to estimate that the design had no potential for service use.