Exhibit V-5. Viewgraphs and Commentary - V/STOL

(Ed note: The commentary was re-typed. As almost every other viewgraph was missing, I would guess that someone did not copy the back of the pages).

V/STOL Conference

12/7/81

Palo Alto

Slide 1. The first slide is an all purpose title page, used in a few programs of the past, which share with V/STOL, the problem of being easy to delineate, but difficult to reduce to practice.


	Slide 2. We should note that this is the first time the Navy has considered transitioning to an all V/STOL force. In the early fifties, during the very successful model testing of the Navy's tail sitters, a goal was set of ten years to reach an all V/STOL force.


	Slides 3, 4. This was related to me by then CDR. Water S. Diehl who quoted a speaker at an IAS meeting similar to this one, but held in New York during WW II. I urge you to keep the message in mind as this conference continues.

Slides 3, 4.
This was related to me by then CDR. Water S. Diehl who quoted a speaker at an IAS meeting similar to this one, but held in New York during WW II.

I urge you to keep the message in mind as this conference continues.

Slide 5 (ED: Missing except for comment).
First let me stipulate that we all agree there are many advantages to V/STOL. The operational flexibility provided is obviously very desirable both afloat and ashore. I will argue the practicability of achieving the goals, not their desirability.

Slide 6.
This chart gives you a very broad brush picture of the magnitude of the task facing those who propose to solve our problem of too few carriers by buying instead V/STOL aircraft and less expensive ships with neither catapults nor arresting gear. Historically, the life cycle costs of an air group are about three times that of the carrier itself, as indicated by the upper bar graph. If we halve the ship cost, we can afford an increase in aircraft cost of only 16.7% if we are to break even. If the aircraft cost is up by a third, the ship cost must be zero.


	Slide 6. This chart gives you a very broad brush picture of the magnitude of the task facing those who propose to solve our problem of too few carriers by buying instead V/STOL aircraft and less expensive ships with neither catapults nor arresting gear. Historically, the life cycle costs of an air group are about three times that of the carrier itself, as indicated by the upper bar graph. If we halve the ship cost, we can afford an increase in aircraft cost of only 16.7% if we are to break even. If the aircraft cost is up by a third, the ship cost must be zero.

Slide 7. Methodology (Ed: Missing)
Designers have long used a weight fraction methodology to do first cut approximations of new aircraft. In its simplest form, the gross weight of an aircraft is broken down into its components of structure, propulsion, equipment(or military load) and fuel. By comparison with existing designs, one can make estimates of the structure, propulsion, and fuel fractions, taking into account the differing characteristics of the existing and projected designs. When the equipment weight is estimated on an absolute basis, the gross weight of the new design is found from the lower equation. As the sum of the structure, propulsion, and fuel fractions approach unity, you will observe that the gross weight approaches infinity, producing that which Ivan Driggs called the "Asymptotic Airplane".

Slide 8. Weight Fractions.
This chart shows weight fractions for ten conventional carrier based airplanes on the left, and six V/STOL designs on the right. The loading conditions for the conventional aircraft are full internal fuel and a "normal" store load. The V/STOL dsign fractions are based on the maximum VTO weight. All weights shown are actuals with the exception of the "FV-12" and the "L+LC" which are proposal estimates. Note the following:

Structural ratios are similar between CTOL and V/STOL, and generally are greater than 30%. New designs are as high as old ones.
The propulsion fraction for V/STOL is substantially higher than CTOL. The new designs show lower fractions than the older ones. The S-3 with a modern, high bypass ration engine has the lowest propulsion fraction. Subsonic V/STOLs require a higher fraction than supersonic CTOLs. The estimated "L+LC" has the lowest propulsion fraction for a V/STOL. Most of the studies since 1960 seem to be in agreement on this point.
Fuel fractions for most of the CTOL designs are on the order of 30%. The high aspect ration S-3 with an efficient engine is only 25%. The V/STOLs tend to be somewhat limited under these conditions.
The yellow portion of the columns represent the equipment, including payload. The larger the equipment fraction, the lower the so-called growth factor. For the V/STOLs, there is a trade off between fuel and equipment fractions possible since full capacity is not being utilized.

Slide 9. (Ed: Missing)
The chart shows the difficulty of trying to match the S-3 in a V/STOL version at the same gross weight. The bar on the left shows the weight breakdown of the S-3, not in fractions this time but in absolute terms. The equipment group has been divided into two parts, that required by the airframe, and that required by the mission. When we try to build a "VS-3" at the same weight as the present airplane, we have to triple the propulsion weight of this relatively low thrust-to- weight ratio design. As a first approximation, we can assume equal structure and equipment weights. To hold the gross weight, we must choose between drastic reductions in either the fuel or the mission load, or alternatively, compromising both range and payload.


	Slide 10. Despite the rather obvious penalty which a vertical take-off requirement imposes, there has arisen a school of thought that the Harrier somehow overcame that handicap and has demonstrated in operational use that a vectored thrust machine has at least the same capability as a conventional close support aircraft. The next few slides will examine that proposition.

Slide 11. A-4/AV-8 Weight Comparison (Ed: missing)
This chart shows a weight breakdown of the Harrier in comparison with a Navy A-4E, an airplane in the same weight class. With full internal fuel, the A-4 is slightly heavier than the Harrier when it is loaded to its hot day VTO weight. In the case shown, the A-4 carries guns and a 2000lb. store, while the Harrier carries only its guns. Note that the structure and airplane equipment weights are almost equal, but the propulsion group for the Harrier is two thirds higher than for the A-4.

Slide 12.
This chart shows some payload radius data from 1971. At that time, the Harrier was being advertised as a 3000 lb.-50 mile close support airplane at VTO weight. The Navy's performance analysts, however, calculated much lower figures, for both a standard VTOL HI-LO-HI mission, and for a special close support mission. In all calculations, the take off and landing reserves for the Harrier were reduced below CTOL standards. It is clear that the advertised AV-8A figures were close to those of the A-4, but that the calculated figures were not. The difference was great as the A-4 could apparently carry four times the load six times as far.

Slide 13. Demonstration (Ed: missing)

In order to convince the skeptics among us, a demonstration flight was arranged and conducted in Great Britain, in which the Harrier actually carried out a 3000lb.-50 mile mission, dropping its bombs at the radius point. Not unexpectedly, the differences between the demonstration and the calculated figured turned out to be a question of ground rules. If one were to believe that the capability of the Harrier was as claimed, it was shown that one should also believe that the Marine A-4 radius with the same load should be 450 nm., an increase of more than 50% over the standard radius. We have yet to find the pilot who considers the standard radius figure to be operationally realistic.

Slide 14
A final look at the payload radius capability of Harrier is shown on this plot in comparison with other attack aircraft, under comparable conditions of 20 knots of wind over the deck for each aircraft. Harrier is shown for both the VTO case and a 320 ft. deck run condition. It is clear that the AV-8A capability is small when compared to the Marine A-4, and far below the requirements of the Navy as exemplified by the A-7 and A-6.

Slide 15. Engine Ratings (Ed. missing)
Now let us look at how the Harrier is able to demonstrate the levels capability shown on the preceding charts. The Pegasus engine ratings are compared to a few U.S. engines. The bar graphs show the maximum engine ratings as a function of the max. continuous rating. A major difference in design philosophy is apparent. Short time, or emergency, ratings of the type used by Harrier would go a long way toward eliminating many of the one engine out critical design requirements which now exist for our conventional designs. There must be a life or maintainability price to be paid with such ratings.


	Slide 16. The Chief of Naval Operations in 1976 announced a plan to transition to an all V/STOL force, after he was advised that V/STOL designs equal in capability to CTOL could be produced at no significant increase in cost. The source of that advice was not identified except as coming from "the technical community". That advice falls into my category of "bum dope".

Slide 17. In 1975 an AIAA article described a lift cruise design which could have contributed to the optimism of the period. In the chart at the left is shown the very significant payload range capability claimed for the design on a STO, VOD mission. Elsewhere in the paper, the STO gross weight is given as under 40000 lbs. On the right of the chart, I have completed the weight-range picture, and show a comparison of what is essentially a "basic operating weight" with that of the S-3, an airplane in the same weight class. It appears that even with the propulsion increase associated with V/STOL, the designer claimed he could provide the structure, propulsion, and equipment groups for about 60% of that necessary in the S-3. There is no possibility that this could be done.

Slide 18. (Ed: missing)
This chart contains data from an early V/STOL study when the designs were restricted in size to that necessary for basing on destroyers. Some of the rhetoric of the era indicated that V/STOL A would have the same mission capability as the S-3. This has to be "bum dope", or at the least, misleading, when it is seen that the mission load was reduced by 30% and the loiter time on station cut in half. An "ASW capability" does not equate to an "S-3 capability".


	Slide 19. We now move from the demonstrably "bum dope" department into what I will call a "raised eyebrow" classification. From the noted AIAA paper, I find it implied that a CTOL design can be built for 42500 lb. which has the combined capability of an A-6 and an F-14, but which is lighter than either. In fact, I am asked to believe that a V/STOL design, only 23% heavier and 30% more costly than the CTOL, is some 10% lighter than the F-14 when it is loaded with only its four Sparrows. The ground rules of the studies which produce such results obviously need revision. Likewise, the multipurpose V/STOL design which supposedly matches the capabilities of the S-3, E-2, C-2, and perhaps the CH-53 seems to be grossly optimistic in both CTOL and V-STOL versions. Some explanation is needed also as to why in this case the cost ratio of V/STOL to CTOL is lower than the weight ratio. There are enough questions without reasonable answers that I would not be willing to use these results in reaching decisions on how to restructure the Navy.

Slide 19.
We now move from the demonstrably "bum dope" department into what I will call a "raised eyebrow" classification. From the noted AIAA paper, I find it implied that a CTOL design can be built for 42500 lb. which has the combined capability of an A-6 and an F-14, but which is lighter than either. In fact, I am asked to believe that a V/STOL design, only 23% heavier and 30% more costly than the CTOL, is some 10% lighter than the F-14 when it is loaded with only its four Sparrows. The ground rules of the studies which produce such results obviously need revision. Likewise, the multipurpose V/STOL design which supposedly matches the capabilities of the S-3, E-2, C-2, and perhaps the CH-53 seems to be grossly optimistic in both CTOL and V-STOL versions. Some explanation is needed also as to why in this case the cost ratio of V/STOL to CTOL is lower than the weight ratio. There are enough questions without reasonable answers that I would not be willing to use these results in reaching decisions on how to restructure the Navy.

Slide 20. (Ed: missing)
This chart shows some ship cost data taken from the same AIAA paper mentioned in the last slide. The red circles are for carriers with both catapults and arresting gear, while the diamonds are for ships with neither. The "+" point is for a STOVL ship with only arresting gear. Nuclear propulsion appears to increase ship costs by 36%. We are apparently asked to believe that the addition of arresting gear increases ship cost by about 30% while costs increase by 60% if we add both catapults and arresting gear. As a non-expert observer, I just don't believe it.


	Slide 21. This slide shows some ship cost data from other sources. The red circle points are from a 1980 article by Adm. Hollway in which he shows that large carriers are more cost effective than small carriers. These points correlate well with the data from the last slide. The other points are all from a private consultant study of about 1978. In that study, a normal Navy carrier design, described as "sophisticated" correlates fairly well with the other cost data. However, a "simple" carrier with both catapults and arresting gear is priced at but a very small fraction of that cost. The simple carrier is based on the use of container ship hulls. Cost differentials of this magnitude are troubling to say the least. Similar differences between commercial and Navy ship costs have contributed in the past to proposals for "air capable ships" or "sea control ships" which combine small air groups on cheap hulls to provide a more cost effective solution than found in normal Navy surface ships. The subject needs illumination.

Slide 21.

This slide shows some ship cost data from other sources. The red circle points are from a 1980 article by Adm. Hollway in which he shows that large carriers are more cost effective than small carriers. These points correlate well with the data from the last slide. The other points are all from a private consultant study of about 1978. In that study, a normal Navy carrier design, described as "sophisticated" correlates fairly well with the other cost data. However, a "simple" carrier with both catapults and arresting gear is priced at but a very small fraction of that cost. The simple carrier is based on the use of container ship hulls. Cost differentials of this magnitude are troubling to say the least. Similar differences between commercial and Navy ship costs have contributed in the past to proposals for "air capable ships" or "sea control ships" which combine small air groups on cheap hulls to provide a more cost effective solution than found in normal Navy surface ships. The subject needs illumination.

Slide 22. (Ed.: missing)
Since advances in "technology" are normally used to justify the practicability of achieving V/STOL without excessive penalty, it may be worthwhile, and thought provoking, to see the effect of the advances in the state of the art in the 23 years between the F-4A and the F-18. As you can see, we achieved a 10% weight reduction from the early F-4 to the F-18 at about the same point in the development cycle while carrying a heavier design armament load, the same avionics weight, half the crew, and less fuel. The original F-4 was not only a faster design, but had a greater radius of action. "Technology" has scarcely wrought a miracle. The significant advances seem to be a much better fire control system and improved "R&M".


	Slide 23 Let me now start to wrap up this discussion. Everyone will recognize that as requirements increase, the weight increases. We try not to let the design get too far to the right in the graph where the design goes into the asymptotic region. When we impose a V/STOL requirement we reach the forbidden region sooner. Or looking at the situation in another way, we see that we must keep requirements, pronounced capability, very low if V/STOL is to be achieved at a moderate penalty.

Slide 23
Let me now start to wrap up this discussion. Everyone will recognize that as requirements increase, the weight increases. We try not to let the design get too far to the right in the graph where the design goes into the asymptotic region. When we impose a V/STOL requirement we reach the forbidden region sooner. Or looking at the situation in another way, we see that we must keep requirements, pronounced capability, very low if V/STOL is to be achieved at a moderate penalty.

Slide 24. (Ed.: missing)
A companion curve can be drawn which says that, in the real world, as we increase the requirements, we also force increased optimism on the part of the designers. Increased competition can have the same effect, as can any decrease in technical capability of the procuring agency.


	Slide 25 This chart shows why over-optimism cannot be tolerated in V/STOL designs, because of the far more serious effects than for CTOL designs. We assume initial 50000 lb. V/STOL and CTOL designs. We then assume 5% optimisms in each of the factors of take-off thrust, weight empty, engine cruise SFC, and airplane L/D. For the V/STOL design, fuel is reduced by the thrust loss and the overweight, leading to a reduction in radius of about 57%. For the CTOL case, by accepting increases in take-off distance, etc. the radius loss is only 13%.

Slide 25
This chart shows why over-optimism cannot be tolerated in V/STOL designs, because of the far more serious effects than for CTOL designs. We assume initial 50000 lb. V/STOL and CTOL designs. We then assume 5% optimisms in each of the factors of take-off thrust, weight empty, engine cruise SFC, and airplane L/D. For the V/STOL design, fuel is reduced by the thrust loss and the overweight, leading to a reduction in radius of about 57%. For the CTOL case, by accepting increases in take-off distance, etc. the radius loss is only 13%.

Slide 26 (Ed.: missing)
This slide lists some of the factors not discussed but which should not be ignored since they bear upon the overall desirability of V/STOL designs. The jet and downwash problems are an order of magnitude more severe in large lift plus lift cruise designs than on the vectored thrust Harrier which has been used to demonstrate an apparent lack of a problem. Safety problems, particularly on lift plus lift cruise designs, can be much tougher to solve than on the single engine Harrier. With the greatly increased complexity inherent in V/STOL, there must be losses in reliability and maintainability. Some of the Harrier testing has indicated that to achieve all the operational benefits of V/STOL, omni-directional landing approach systems and hover aids will have to be developed.


	Slide 27. Summing up, my overall viewpoint is that the relative weight, size, and cost relationships being assumed between V/STOL and CTOL are much too optimistic, if we are to hold our current level of capability. When these ratios are revised to realistic values, all the cost effectiveness studies will show that V/STOL is not a viable alternative. We will end up losing capability, already too low, and increasing our costs, already too high.

Slide 27.

Summing up, my overall viewpoint is that the relative weight, size, and cost relationships being assumed between V/STOL and CTOL are much too optimistic, if we are to hold our current level of capability. When these ratios are revised to realistic values, all the cost effectiveness studies will show that V/STOL is not a viable alternative. We will end up losing capability, already too low, and increasing our costs, already too high.

Slide 28 (Ed: missing)

On a positive note, it appears to me that as a supplement to the CV force for ASW/Convoy/Show of force missions, the Navy should reinvent the CVS, CVL, and CVE type of carriers, and restudy the optimum mix of CTOL and Helos to be deployed on each.

Slide 29. Philosophy