Exhibit VF-1. A retyped paper

The development of any airplane involves an unending series of compromises. From the earliest conceptual studies to the final design and manufacture of each detail part, designers are faced with the problem of reaching the best compromise between many very real conflicts. For every desirable characteristic achieved, some other desirable feature has been compromised. This truism applies not only to performance items such as maximum speed, maximum range, maximum endurance, minimum landing speed and minimum take-off distance, but also to the obvious trade-off between strength and weight, and to the less obvious interaction between development schedules, testing programs and cost. For the military planner, choices must often be made between buying either more airplanes or more spare parts. He has to choose between continuing to buy aircraft already in production as opposed to investing in a new development. There will be circumstances when larger numbers of less expensive designs are preferable to fewer numbers of more capable aircraft. Unfortunately, in other circumstances, the reverse is true. The well known case of the U-2 illustrates the problem. The thousands of Russian service fighters were unable to prevent the USAF U-2 overflights in the 1950s simply because they could not fly high enough, nor were they equipped with missiles and fire control systems which would overcome that inadequacy. On the other hand, the U-2 had had to sacrifice many features normally considered necessary to achieve its extraordinary altitude and range characteristics. Overall, to repeat, the compromises are unending, and many of the decisions of choice are most difficult.

By the early 1950s, the state of the art had advanced to the point where supersonic combat aircraft were being produced to replace the subsonic jets then in service. At the same time, cruise missile development had advanced with relatively long range, high performance projects under way in this country and abroad. Naval aviation, in planning for the future, obviously took these advances into account, and configured their newest fighter, the F-4 Phantom, with new air to-air radar, and armed it with all weather, radar guided missiles. Although this project was the best that could be done at the time and was able to handle the immediate threat posed by the Soviets, the Navy was concerned about the next step which they might make.

Research efforts in the radar field at about this same time clearly showed that it was possible to build a very long range radar, which could be installed in a moderately sized, carrier based airplane. This opened up the possibility that advanced threats could be handled by long range air-to-air missiles launched from relatively inexpensive, low performance airplanes, rather than by continuing to increase fighter performance to the levels required. In one of the most extensive operational analyses, code named RAFAD, yet conducted in this field, the Navy studied the problem of how best to meet an advanced threat against a carrier task force, and concluded that a low performance airplane launching high performance missiles, was the most cost effective solution. The concept was then developed as EAGLE-MISSILEER. The missile, EAGLE, and the fire control system were started first since their development times were longer than for the airplane, and firm specifications for those items were needed for the airplane competition. Bendix, with Grumman as a subcontractor, won the EAGLE competition in 1958 with a design for a long range (over 100 miles), two stage missile with mid-course and terminal guidance. The fire control system, using a Westinghouse radar with a five foot diameter antenna, was capable of tracking many targets simultaneously, and firing at the six most threatening. With the missile development proceeding satisfactorily, the airplane competition was held, and Douglas selected to develop the MISSILEER in 1960. The airplane was a 50,000 lb., twin turbo-fan engined, straight wing airplane with a crew of two. It was designed to operate from all attack aircraft carriers, and to stay on station for five hours at 35,000 ft. altitude. The relatively large EAGLE missiles were carried externally on wing pylons.

At about the same time that the Navy was embarking on EAGLE-MISSILEER, the Air Force was developing the other alternative to handle the projected threat. The XF-12 was a very high performance, mach 3.0, airplane, powered by two large after-burning jet engines. Two medium range, single shot, missiles were carried internally, and guided by a Hughes radar and fire control system. The airplane was over twice as large as MISSILEER, and well beyond the limits established by the size of the Navy's carriers. This particular concept was not viable for the Navy, even if it had fared better in the cost effectiveness studies mentioned earlier. Subsequently, the XF-12 and its missile were dropped, but the air frame was produced in a reconnaissance version as the SR-71.

The MISSILEER development was started with a small preliminary engineering contract, but major funding was deferred by the Secretary of Defense until the incoming administration could review the program and make its own determination as to whether or not it should be undertaken. The EAGLE portion of the concept, however, continued on schedule.

Within the Navy and throughout the defense establishment, there was some degree of controversy over the MISSILEER concept. It had great merit in those situations where the enemy came toward it, that is, point defense. It lacked mobility in many other tactical situations, however, and in peace time lacked the ability to accomplish non-lethal intercepts, as were routinely accomplished by conventional high performance fighters. There was also the fact that the concept was totally dependent on the EAGLE missile, with no real back up armament possible. Lesser capability air-to air missiles, while usable, would not be able to handle the projected enemy aircraft, and the overall weapon system would be inferior with these missiles, to the F-4, then in production.

While the Navy was seeking funding for continuing the F6D-1 MISSILEER, the Air Force was in the preliminary stages of a competition for an aircraft designated as TFX, for Tactical Fighter Experimental. It is difficult to imagine two more different "fighter" aircraft. The Navy fighter's primary mission was to destroy enemy aircraft and missiles in the air. The primary mission of the Air Force TFX was interdiction, delivering a nuclear weapon against a ground target. Air Force studies had produced a requirement for a supersonic, low altitude design, which would be capable of a 400 mile high speed, Mach 1.2, sea level, dash to a target, after a 400 mile subsonic sea level cruise to the mid point. Cruise home would be under economical altitude and speed conditions. The supersonic dash speed and distance were overpowering in their effect on the design, and eventually the Air Force cut the distance in half to 200 miles in order to keep the airplane size within reasonable limits.

In early 1961, within a few weeks of taking office, the new Secretary of Defense decided that the Air Force and Navy should build a single airplane to handle the "fighter" needs of both services and also to meet the close air support requirements for all the services. Eventually, the close air support mission was dropped from TFX and fulfilled by the Navy's development of the A-7. Under the mandate of a single aircraft to accomplish air-to-air missions for the Navy and interdiction for the Air Force, the Navy was forced to drop the MISSILEER concept, as it was completely unsuitable for low level, high speed, penetration type of flight. EAGLE, the missile development was then cancelled in the spring of 1961. The Navy, still seeking a solution to the advanced Soviet threat which was being forecast, then proposed a Navy TFX, supersonic design similar in some respects to the Air Force TFX, but with quite dissimilar compromises on other characteristics. The radar and missiles were reduced in capability to be compatible with a supersonic airplane, as well as the endurance time. For the Air Force, the airplane could have accomplished an interdiction mission but with a reduced dash speed and distance. The Air Force proposed their TFX to the Navy modified to carry single shot GAR-9 missiles. The overall length of the airplane (82.5 ft) was much too long for it to be operated on existing aircraft carriers. OSD during this same period proposed compromises of its own which generally offered the services characteristics somewhere between those being advanced by the Navy and Air Force.

In June 1961 SECDEF directed that a single TFX program, under Air Force management, be undertaken to fulfill the needs of both the Air Force and the Navy. Negotiations to reach an acceptable and practical compromise failed and in August 1961, both services recommended to OSD that separate programs be authorized since no single design could meet the minimum requirements established by the two services. OSD, on 1 September 1961, disagreed and ordered the issuance of a Request for Proposal to industry for a design meeting those requirements, and imposing a length restraint of 73 ft. and a take off weight of "approximately 62,000 lb." for the Air Force version. The order was met, despite the strong beliefs of the services that the task being imposed on industry was impossible. At this point, the performance requirements of the Air Force mission were unchanged from their original specifications, but the airplane length had been shortened (by about 10 feet) making it more difficult to meet the Mach 1.2, 200 mile dash. The Navy's requirement for the airplane to be operational from all its attack carriers was compromised by eliminating all but the largest sized ships from consideration. No compromise was left for the Navy from carrier compatibility requirements.

The Navy started development of the new radar, fire control system, and missile at the same time the TFX airplane competition started, and selected Hughes as the prime contractor. The AWG-9 fire control system included a radar with a 36 inch diameter antenna while the system retained the multishot capability of the cancelled EAGLE-MISSILEER. The missile, PHOENIX, was reduced to a single stage semi-active design with a terminal seeker. Overall, the new system had about half the range capability of the original EAGLE-MISSILEER.

The airplane source selection phase turned out to be one of the longest and most controversial in history as it went through four steps, each involving proposals by industry, evaluation and recommendations. Boeing had submitted the best design, but General Dynamics, with Grumman as an associate, was announced as the winner in November 1952 by the OSD.

The Air Force version of the General Dynamics design the F-111A, had been evaluated by the Air Force as having only a 140 mile dash capability, although the contractor had guaranteed 210 miles. Shortly, after development started, the contractor realized that he was going to have problems meeting his guarantee and proposed increasing the weight, length and fuel capacity of the airplane, his normal procedure on past Air Force contracts under similar circumstances. The Navy version of the design, the F-111B, could not tolerate changes of this nature, leaving the contractor in a design predicament from which there was little possibility of escape. During 1963, a substantial growth in the estimated weight of the airplane occurred, although it was not reported until the end of the year when General Dynamics acknowledged a 5000 lb. increase. In fact, the increase then was 3000 lb. greater, but a weight improvement program had been assumed to remove this amount. In early 1969, the Navy conducted a thorough evaluation of the design as it was then defined, and found it unacceptable. It was recommended that the program be stopped pending redesign to solve the problems. The OSD declined to take this step, apparently not believing Navy estimates, and hoping that minor changes and weight reduction efforts would be adequate. The Navy continued to report the airplane as unacceptable on the basis of calculated data through October 1965 when the first Navy flight test data became available, and thereafter until Congress refused authorizing further funds in 1968, leading to contract termination of the F-111B.

Since it was obvious to the Navy from the beginning of the TFX program that its success as a Navy fighter was highly questionable, the Navy continued its study efforts to find some means of procuring a weapon system that would handle the threat and be a successful general purpose, carrier based fighter. With OSD insistence on the F-111B continuing, the Navy looked at many alternatives. The F-111B was most nearly useful when employed in a fleet air defense role, in effect acting as a MISSILEER but with half the capability. Other fighter missions, such as escorting attack airplanes, had to be done with a higher performance, more maneuverable, and more versatile airplane than the F-111B. Grumman, associated with General Dynamics, had performed F-111 improvement studies, under contract, ranging from minor changes to complete redesigns. McDonnell had also studied, under contract, various improvements to the F-4, including a design with a variable sweep wing. A new airplane, to complement the F-111B, was also under study by everyone. This design finally evolved as a multi-mission airplane, VFAX, capable of performing better than a F-4 as a fighter, and better than the A-7 as an attack airplane. The concept was valid only under the premise that it was complementary to the AWG-9 and Phoenix capability represented by the F-111B. However, as the latter design degraded in attractiveness, by 1967 and 1968, very serious study efforts were undertaken to find a true solution of the Navy's fighter problem. In essence, this finally evolved as upgrading the VFAX to carry the AWG-9 fire control system and the Phoenix missiles. The first definitive studies were completed by Grumman and provided the information by which the Navy convinced itself and the Congress, if not OSD, that a new fighter, VFX, could be produced which was more effective and less costly than continuing the F-111B and providing an adequate complementary fighter. OSD gradually accepted the realty of the VFX concept, but only after the Navy produced confirmatory design studies from Chance Vought, North American, and McDonnell. A formal Navy Fighter Study was convened by the Chief of Naval Operations to produce the quantitative operational analysis results necessary to convince those in OSD who still believed the Navy to be fighting the program on other than conscientious grounds, and also to persuade the Congress to authorize a new program. In mid 1968, approval was granted the Navy to release a Request for Proposal to industry for the VFX, ending about nine years of frustration for those whose only goal had been to provide the country with a means to counter the new aircraft and missiles which the Russians had been producing. The "threat" which had been projected in the mid 50s, was well documented by the late 60s.

The excellent proposals submitted by McDonnell, Vought, North American, and General Dynamics were overshadowed by a better one from Grumman, with the result that a contract for the F-14 was negotiated and signed on 3 February 1969 after a difficult, but successful competition. The fixed price incentive type of contract covered the development of the airplane, the building of the R & D, or test aircraft, and their testing. Also included were firm ceiling price options for production aircraft to be exercised consecutively in the following fiscal years. Under the original plan, a total of 469 aircraft would have been produced at a rate which built up to eight per month. The F-14, the only fighter designed to counter the full spectrum of the projected threat against the fleet, was finally on its way.