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Exhibit VF-13. A retyped Memorandum for the Record



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
WASHIINGTON. D.C. 20361


AIR-C :GS

21 October 1974


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: The VFAX/ACF Program - A Review

  1. Under pressure from OSD and the Congress, the Navy is now engaged with the Air Force in an attempt to achieve as near common an airplane as possible to satisfy the requirements for an Air Force "Air Combat Fighter" (ACF), and a Navy fighter attack type (VFAX) in addition to making it attractive in the European fighter market. By direction, the design must be derived from the presently flying Air Force technology prototypes, the General Dynamics YF-16, and the Northrop YF-17. The situation is reminiscent of 1961 when OSD directed the services to develop a single set of requirements for a new design rather than proceeding with separate Air Force and Navy fighters. At that time the OSD decision makers failed to heed service positions first on the impracticability of combining the requirements, and later of meeting them with a common design. Thus far, our current OSD decision makers seem intent on repeating the mistakes of the past, with apparently less resistance from the services than during the TFX preliminaries. It will be recalled that in that case the Navy turned out to be the major loser with its requirement for an advanced fighter deferred until the F-111B could be proved to be as unsatisfactory as the Navy had predicted. The deferral of meeting the total fighter requirement is now being extended while our inadequate resources are expended on another losing venture in "commonality". It is unfortunate that those in OSD fail to recognize that the Navy is fully as conscious of the financial problems in defense procurement as they are, and that many of the OSD "solutions" being suggested have been considered and found wanting.


  2. Those engineers now involved in negotiating details with the Air Force recognize that we have been here before and have asked for suggestions on how to avoid entrapment. Advice to the working level, however, is of little help since constraints already established preclude any chance of the problem being solved by their actions. Honest efforts to achieve the best Navy design in negotiations with the Air Force actually are probably harmful to the real needs of the Navy. Gradualism is now obvious in the process, as a fighter capability considered totally inadequate a few years ago is now the best that can be achieved under present guidelines. Based on the TFX experience, it will probably cost less in the long run if the Navy permits the common airplane to remain as incapable as the current YF-16/YF-17 in order to strengthen the case later against the design as a production item. Navy efforts to improve the
    F-111B certainly lengthened its life span despite scepticism to the contrary. In this case, if we achieve the full VFAX requirements in negotiation, we still lose the fighter game with a capability actually rated less than that of an F-4 by our operational analysts.


  3. The "common" fighter which has been directed impacts on the capabilities of the European nations, the Air Force, and the Navy quite differently. For example:


    1. The European nations have no problem. They are in the market to replace F-104s, and have several designs from which to choose all with more capability than the F-104. With competition between at least Sweden, France, and the U. S., it is probable that they will find a cost effective solution.


    2. The Air Force situation is quite unique. At present, the ACF is being offered to them by OSD as an addition to their programmed force structure. Since it replaces nothing, it can only increase total Air Force capability. The F-15 is still programmed to replace those F-4s not already replaced by F-111s. It is clear that, at the moment, the Air Force has nothing to lose in this program..


    3. The Navy, as so often is the case, is in a position where they cannot win. Their planned force of F-14s has been halved by OSD action leaving half of the current F-4 squadrons to be replaced by a lesser design, either the newly defined VFAX or an even less capable compromise with the Air Force's ACF. Since VFAX as a fighter is less capable than the F-4, it is clear that the Navy is bound to lose fighter capability to a level well below the declared need.


  4. For the sake of perspective it may be worthwhile to review how the two services reached their current position in the development game.


    1. The USAF had their TFX program underway when the McNamara regime arrived. The F-111A survived the 1961 common fighter effort only slightly degraded and is regarded as a success by the Air Force as a long range interdiction strike aircraft. (The Navy would have labeled it an attack airplane.) In 1961-1962, the F-111 was to be the F-4 replacement. After the Navy defined its VFX (which became the F-14) in the 1966-1967 era, the Air Force started a definition effort for a FX. After considering all types from very simple designs to very high speed/high altitude interceptors, their choice became the F-15, a design with less weapon system capability than the F-14, but with more than that of their F-4E. In a political sense the choice was sound, the high capability approach had been preempted by the F-14, and so the moderate size, lower cost, single seat design had attraction. The simplistic, very light weight designs, were rejected since they could not be justified as an F-4 replacement. In 1970-1971, when the "Prototype" philosophy was pushed by OSD, the Air Force responded with their usual alacrity and offered several programs, OSD selected a light weight fighter project which eventually became the YF-16/YF-17 advanced technology prototypes. The Air Force was careful to stress the lack of a production intent since that could impact their F-15 program. The latter has continued as programmed to be an F-4 replacement. To further the OSD desire for a high/low mix concept, they offered the ACF to the USAF as the low end of a mix, but without reducing the high end F-15 program. If OSD considers the ACF to be an F-4 replacement, it brings to three the number of programs which the Air Force will use to replace their F-4 inventory. During the period in question, the OSD and the Air Force also funded the "International Fighter" development, the F-5E/F at Northrop, which was designed for sale in the lower end of the international market


    2. At the start of the McNamara regime, the Navy Eagle-Missileer program was canceled in order that a common fighter for the Navy and Air Force could be pursued. The Air Force was given the management job and eventually the F-111 program was started attempting to meet widely divergent requirements. Although initially considered as a complete F-4 replacement, the F-111B gradually lost capability until it was useful only for CAP missions leading the Navy to search for a complementary fighter since OSD was adamant that the F-111B should continue. When no cost effective solution was found to procuring a single squadron of complementary fighters, a combination fighter/attack design, designated as VFAX, was studied and found promising. The F-111E/VFAX approach was dropped when it became apparent that, first, the F-111B could not be made satisfactory for carrier use even for only the CAP mission, and second, studies showed two squadrons/carrier of "VFX" to be more effective and less expensive than the other alternatives. Although this conclusion has been sustained by all the operational analyses conducted since that time, the F-14 program has been cut back by OSD to provide but one squadron/carrier. A lower cost complementary fighter has been directed. When no satisfactory secondary fighter could be found which cost less than buying more F-14s, the VFAX concept was resurrected and requirements written around a single design which could replace both the F-4 and A-7. By increasing the numbers of aircraft, it was hoped that replacement costs could be held to a level acceptable to OSD. Under the current plan, the Navy will thus require two models to replace its F-4 inventory.


  5. The rebirth of VFAX was accomplished with no real analysis as to the merit of the idea under current conditions. Fighter Study No. 4 discussed the advantages of a reduced number of types aboard a carrier, but really showed no reduction except under the rather artificial constraint which assumes a single F-14 squadron. A mix of F-14 and VFAX obviously involves fewer models than either F-14 plus F-4 plus A-7 or
    F-14 plus "VFX" plus A-7. Intuitively, however, it appears that two squadrons each of F-14s and A-7s will have more capability and cost less than one squadron of F-14s plus three VFAXs. Hence, the total exercise may well be ill-advised on purely cost grounds even assuming that VFAX as now defined is really satisfactory as either an F-4 or A-7 replacement, a question which deserves more investigation.


  6. As a fighter, Navy operational analysts would give the current F-4J+ an advantage over the VFAX by virtue of its longer radar detection range and its two-man crew. Although in a one on one close in engagement, VFAX would be considered superior, that advantage is more than offset by the other factors. In range, VFAX is better than the F-4 is now, but worse than the F-4 was when it was proposed. With a design 400-450 nautical mile internal fuel radius, the design will be shorter legged than any carrier airplane started in the last 20 years. Note that the F8U-1 internal fuel radius was 500 n. miles when it started in 1953 carrying either 4-20 mm guns or 60-2 inch rockets, and while using a severe combat fuel allowance of 10 minutes mil. thrust plus 5 min. max.. A/B thrust. As an escort for the A-7/A-6, VFAX would require external tanks to about the same degree (always) as the F-4.


  7. As an attack airplane, the VFAX appears significantly less capable than the A-7, especially if one assumes that the VFAX uses its afterburner. In previous studies of afterburning equipped attack types, use of the afterburner in combat was a standard requirement. It seems quite unrealistic to assume otherwise, particularly when the only significant performance advantage over the A-6/A-7 lies in the speed and acceleration at maximum thrust. It may be recalled that after the HIPASS study program, an afterburning engined version of the A-7 was studied in detail, but its increased weight and cost made it unattractive at least until the higher combat performance is shown to be necessary. Even without afterburner usage, the VFAX appears well below the A-7 in radius capability.


  8. Overall, my opinions may be summarized as:


    1. VFAX as now defined is not a suitable replacement for either the F-4 or the A-7. If it is pursued, naval aviation must be prepared to cut back its operational strike range to something little better than that represented by the F-4/A-4 combination.


    2. The combination of one F-14 squadron plus three VFAX squadrons will prove to be more costly and less effective than two
      F-14 squadrons plus two A-7 squadrons.


    3. The ACF will prove to be more costly and less effective for the Air Force than an equal number of additional
      F-15s.


    4. The common airplane exercise with the Air Force will prove as useless as were the TFX and Tri-Service Transport efforts.


  9. A major effort is obviously required to stop the current misdirected efforts in the Navy and in industry. We have available for the buying the world's most capable fighter, and should be able to convince even the OSD staff that a mixed force will cost more and do less. In the attack field we should start a program to at least match A-7E weapon system/payload/range capability in a twin engine two-seat model with other improvements as determined by the attack community to allow survival in the future. Two seat, two engine will be the principal justification.


G. A. SPANGENBERG