Exhibit VF-14. Retyped Statement on NACF and Lightweight Fighters

Statement of G.A. Spangenberg to Sub-Committee

of HASC on 9 April 1975

Mr. Chairman and Members:

I'm glad to be here and hope that I may be of some help to you in your deliberations.

My position is somewhat strange at the moment. I am consulting still for the Naval Air Systems Command and have had access to many of the Navy estimates on the programs which you have under consideration. However, I am speaking today only as a private citizen, and will offer no quantitative figures on either the new or on-going programs, as such figures should come from the Navy. Although my conclusions will be drawn in relative terms, I'm quite sure that you will be able to substantiate them when you get the absolute figures.

Statement of G. A. Spangenberg to Sub-Committee

of HASC on 9 April 1975

1. I have been asked to give you my thoughts on the Navy Air Combat Fighter (NACF), lightweight fighters in general, and on the related other tactical aircraft programs.



2. After a career of involvement with naval aircraft design and procurement, I am naturally biased in support of naval aviation. The success record of the designs originated by the Navy has been high, most have been proved in combat, and many have been by other services and other countries. The lessons we learned in the development of the successful aircraft, and from the occasional failures we encountered, were applied conscientiously to the next generation of designs. Each new type was justified as offering a major improvement at a reasonable cost over an existing model prior to initiating its development, as well as being necessary to counter projected threats. It seems obvious that within the DOD we have some individuals who are either uninformed as to this history, or are determined to ignore it by sponsoring projects which fail to meet the requirement for greater effectiveness at a reasonable cost. In this regard, I find that I cannot support the NACF as it is now defined since I believe a greater capability at a lower cost is already available to us.



3. Since the current situation is somewhat unusual, a brief review of the steps which preceded it are in order:



1. In 1971, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Packard, directed the Navy to investigate the possibility of achieving a lower cost alternative, such as the F-15, to meeting its requirements. This action was taken during the period in which Grumman, the F-14A contractor, was having major financial problems in meeting his contractual commitments. A brief study, in collaboration with the Air Force, revealed that a version of the F-15 modified to meet the Navy's requirements would be even more expensive from that point on.



2. In 1973, Mr. Packard's successor, Mr. Clements directed the Navy to seek a lower cost fighter to complement the F-14A, procurement of which was being restricted to half that initially planned. When the Navy again found no attractive alternative toward buying the full quantity of F-14As, a plan to prototype a number of designs was directed. This plan failed of congressional support when it was shown that the cost of prototyping and building a mixed force would again cost more than the full F-14 force.



3. In 1974, the concept of a "VFAX" was resurrected in which a versatile new fighter attack design would complement the F-14 and also replace the two squadrons of light attack A-7 aircraft normally carried on each carrier. Conceptually, this plan had much more merit than did the earlier proposals since the procurement based was broadened, the performance level of the attack force was increased, and some operational flexibility to offset the loss in individual fighter capability by increased quantities was realized. A similar concept existed in the mid 60's when one squadron of F-111Bs on each carrier was being dictated by OSD. At that time, "VFAX" was an F-4 sized airplane utilizing variable sweep wings to achieve a combination of "better than F-4 as a fighter and better than A-7 as an attack airplane." That VFAX was shelved when the Navy was finally able to prove that two squadrons of a new fighter (which became the F-14) and two squadrons of A-7s provided more effectiveness at a lower total cost. Congress agreed and stopped funding the F-111B.



4. The possibility of achieving a VFAX design with sufficient capability to warrant procurement was then eliminated when direction was received from the Congress that only a Navy version of the Air Force's Air Combat Fighter (ACF) could be considered. That design with far less capability than an F-4J in the Navy fighter role, and with far less capability than the A-7E in the Navy attack mission, could not conceivably serve as an adequate replacement for either. Despite the technically obvious, the contractors involve and the Navy have all expended a great deal of effort endeavoring to comply with the requirements levied upon them.



4. With the review above in mind, it is probably that the NACF will be reported to be a feasible design capable of meeting some naval mission requirements. It may, or may not be reported, that the designs, while superficially similar to the ACF, probably represent a far greater divergence from the original YF-16 and YF-17 than any previous growth modification of a basic design. The variances are far greater than those between Air Force and Navy versions of the F-111 or those proposed for the F-15. Both development and production costs will approximate those of a new design.



5. If the NACF were to be procured only as a fighter to complement the F-14, the conclusions reached previously would apply showing a great loss n effectiveness as compared to two squadrons of F-14s and with an increase in funds required from this point on. If the NACF were to be purchased in quantities sufficient to serve as a fighter complement and as an A-7 replacement, both fighter and attack capabilities would be reduced relative to a basic mix of two squadrons each of F-14s and A-7s, while again increasing the funds required from this point forward. Justification for the design appears impossible using criteria formerly regarded as logical.



6. Turning now to other issues which have been raised in the last few years and on which my thoughts may be of interest:



1. The high-low mix concept being strongly pushed by OSD as a means of reducing defense expenditures should be examined critically. With procurements as limited in total quantities as we are now considering, it is probably that any aircraft buy splitting the procurement between high and low capability types will prove more costly than buying only the higher capability designs. A generalized study of the problem was shown in an article in "Astronautics and Aeronautics" (September, 1974), while all the specific studies done in connection with F-14 alternatives support this conclusion.



2. Another argument presented by the high low mix advocates seems to say that we should have high capability types only to deal with high threats, and low capability types to handles lesser threats. Although this argument would probably not be pursued if the costs of the mix were unfavorable, it is still disturbing that anyone should advocate approaching a combat engagement with forces designed more for equality than for absolute superiority. It is a form of gradualism that always leads to failure.



3. There are periodic attempts to force the Navy to use Air Force designs in order to save development funds, and there have even been suggestions that total force levels could be reduced if the Air Force were to operate at times from naval carriers. Those who advocate such ideas are obviously not aware that the catapulting and arresting requirements associated with carrier operation dictate major redesign of any aircraft optimized for land based use. This absolutely precludes use of Air Force designs from carrier operation. If a common aircraft is required, one must start with a design to Navy requirements. This is a one way street.



4. We also face an advocacy of lightweight fighters equipped with short range weapons and optimized for the close in engagement. These advocates fail to recognize that the high incidence of such combat in Viet Nam was a direct result of our self imposed rules of visual identification and that in fact we are bound to lose in such a combat against an adversary with an equal state of the art design. Invariably, he has a lesser range requirement, and hence should always have an advantage. We are forced to longer range weapons if we are to prevail.



7. In summary, I believe that the concept of the NACF is unsound and should not be supported. We should use the funds to increase our procurement of F-14s and to continue A-7 production. In the development area, we should have a higher capability air-to-air missile system started to replace, eventually, the Phoenix already more than 10 years old. New engine developments should have been started several years ago to enable a suitable A-7 replacement to be designed and to allow exploitation of V/STOL capabilities. Our funds are much too scarce to squander them on any program which fails to meet reasonable cost effectiveness goals.