Exhibit VF-15. Retyped

NFS IV

G.A. Spangenberg

16 Sep 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The Fighter Study Dilemmas

The Navy Fighter Study is facing a series of dilemmas as it attempts to comply with mutually incompatible directives, desires, and instructions. It is becoming increasingly clear that a full scale effort is required to present the real facts to higher authority in a manner which will permit resolution of the issues.

Mr. Clements, in his testimony to Congress, made reference to two issues, a general one concerning what total aircraft program was needed to replace the F-4 in view of the increased capability of our adversaries, and a second one as to how many F-14A airplanes with Phoenix capability were required. Mr. Clements stated that his decision to seek less costly alternatives after a buy of F-14As for the FAD mission, was based on a study conducted by Dr. Flax in addition to his own review of the situation. Dr. Flax included a similar thought to the effect that even if 313 F-14As were purchased the problem of replacing the rest of the F-4 inventory remained. Dr. Flax concluded with a statement that we need an airplane considerably more capable than the F-4J and considerably cheaper than the F-14A. A qualification was added to the effect that unless we could afford all F-14As, the Navy should be encouraged to initiate actions leading to a competitive program.

Note particularly that both Mr. Clements and Dr. Flax stated categorically that the replacement aircraft needs more capability that the F-4. This of course, is the very problem which the Navy has been attempting to solve since the late 50s when Eagle/Missileer was started. That project was superseded by an OSD decision to pursue the TFX, a project doomed to failure from its inception. Before its final demise, the F-111B had been relegated only to the Fleet Air Defense (FAD) role while plans were started for a lower cost, supplementary fighter, then called VFAX, to handle some of the fighter roles and also to serve in the attack role. Briefly, it was planned to be more capable than the F-4 as a fighter and as capable in bomb delivery as an A-7. This approach was a viable one as long as political considerations forced the F-111B on the Navy. Eventually, the characteristics of VFAX and the F-111B were combined into VFX, a project which promised more FAD capability than the F-111B, equal airplane performance with VFAX and for less cost than continuing the F-111B. It is obvious now that almost the same game is being replayed, but with new players on each team and with the roles reversed. Technically, the VFX (F-14) is a success, and has met the original goals of being better than the F-111/F-4, while retaining an A-7 attack capability. Cost increases, generated by reduced procurements and inflation, however, have combined to create a cost problem in the minds of OSD and the Congress. Internally, the Navy has been convinced that the only logical answer is to buy the F-14A in accordance with the original concept, while the OSD is pushing for other, undefined alternatives, despite the fact that no study has yet shown a more cost effective solution that the F-14A.

Since there is little possibility of a different solution than the F-14A for the "better than the F-4" as a replacement, the advocates of change have now introduced other concepts. The most disturbing is that only a non-Soviet threat should be considered. This, of course, changes the game completely. If one assumes a low enough threat level, obviously we do not need F-4s, much less F-14s. If carried to the limit, we could eliminate all the active services, and all development activities. For fighting non-Soviet threats, perhaps we could buy Soviet equipment, or even better, convince the Soviets to fight the non-Soviets for us. Logic would appear to dictate that we must be prepared to handle the worst threat that can be mounted, or be prepared to surrender our position. It is doubtful that carriers could be justified if usable only against minor threats because of lack of quality. Quantity considerations, of course, are a different matter.

The high-low mix concept of fighters is believed to have originated in OSD after a study showed that the free world would be outnumbered in fighters in all probable areas of conflict. The "solution" then was to buy some cheaper airplanes to mix with first line equipment in order to provide more nearly equal numbers within an assumed budget. This led to the USAF's prototype competition from which the XF-16 and XF-17 emerged. If any real analysis on the merits of the concept was done, it has not been publicized. There is no evidence that the mix would enable even numerical equality, or that the quality of the total force would be greater than investing the same money in the most capable fighters available.

During WW II, the Navy had two levels of fighters, the F6F/F4U series on the major carriers, and the F4F/FM series on the escort carriers. Each fighter, however, was the best that could be designed to operate on the particular carrier class. Obviously, the merit of the high-low concept was recognized within the Navy, as we specialized in carriers. Unfortunately, as the total number of carriers was reduced, it became impracticable to continue the specialization and the CVS and CVA classes have merged again into the CV, so we are back where it all started.

An understanding of the advantages of the mix concept, has also been demonstrated by optimizing the complement from a cost standpoint. The relatively high cost fighters are mixed with lower performance level attack aircraft. The latter, in the Navy, are still subsonic designs, primarily because of the cost problem. A-7 and A-6 airplanes are much cheaper than the F-105, F-4, and F-111 designs used by the Air Force for similar missions.

The number of different airplanes being procured is constantly under attack in the Congress. Minimizing the number of models on a carrier has long been a Navy goal. The complementary fighter concept runs counter to these desires. Minimizing of carrier types, intuitively, will be better achieved by proceeding from the current F-4/A-6/A-7/RA-5C/E-2 complement to an F-14/A-7/E-2 group. The addition of a fighter type needlessly complicates the problem, while another suggested alternative of making the second fighter an A-7 replacement is undoubtedly too costly.

As noted previously, the probabilities are great that the USA will be outnumbered in most engagements in the future. While light weight fighters may have a lower unit production cost, it is quite unrealistic to assume that funds will permit achieving numerical equality. Our only real hope is to maintain a qualitative superiority. This is technically impossible in a pure airframe sense, under assumptions of equal technical ability, since we will always have a greater range requirement, leading to greater weight and reduced performance. Our approach has been the only one available to us, viz., better weapons to outrange the opponent, and a multi-shot system to offset the numerical disadvantage. Training, tactics, and personnel quality considerations are obviously also involved, but these should provide the edge of superiority after equalizing the weapons as nearly as we can.

A final point on the quality issue is that even infinite numbers of some fighters have no possibility of successfully engaging some threats. Most of the "light weight" fighters with their weapons are incapable of bothering currently flying supersonic transports, much less the missiles which could be launched from such platforms. Certainly something better than the F-4 is required.

An issue to be faced in any new development will be the difference in scheduling required to meet the desired '78 budgets, to minimize costs and that scheduling (Ed. My thought on a missing word) currently required under outstanding test and evaluation directives. If "alternatives" are to be really available to a decision maker, he must have all of his development completed since production lead time alone consumes the time from the budget fiscal year to the next calendar year when deliveries start. Expensive luxuries like "prototypes," "fly-before-buy," and "operational test before production commitments" must be ignored. This is not a problem to the Navy which has successfully practiced concurrent development programs for many years, but it is a problem to certain of the OSD components.

A firm position should be taken by the Navy against compromises at this time which cost money, our most important problem, reduce our capability, already too low, and which will eventually destroy carrier aviation.