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Exhibit VF-17. A retyped Memo to William Clements, then DepSecDef


G. A. SPANGENBERG
1531 DAHLIA COURT
MCLEAN, VA. 22101


22 October 1975

From: G. A. Spangenberg

To: William P. Clements


Subject: Dissents - F-18 and General

  1. On 21 October 1975, each of us appeared before, and made a statement to, the Senate Appropriations Committee on the subject of the F-18 program. Included in my statement were references to the impracticability of dissent to OSD established programs from within a service ever surfacing through the staff layers to either your level in DOD, or to the Congress. I'm reasonably sure you felt I was wrong in both the implied, and explicit, criticisms which I made from your remarks to the committee and in particular to the statement that "George was never stifled". You should know that I, and many of us at the working level, have long been frustrated by our obvious inability to get adequate and accurate facts and recommendations to the decision maker before he committed us to programs of dubious, or worse, merit. You should know also that I, personally, have been "stifled" on numerous occasions, and I certainly am not alone in this category.


  2. Overall, it seems to me that whoever is preparing your statements on the F-18 issue, and advising you on the general administration of DOD is misleading you as badly as were the staffs of Mr. McNamara on the TFX and Mr. Packard on the HLH program. First I would like to review for you a few cases involving the issues of dissents and/or faulty information:


    1. In the hearing on 19 June 1973 before the Cannon Sub-Committee, when asked about the origin of the prototype plan, for which you had taken credit, you replied, "I think, Mr. Chairman, that I can say in all modesty that they (the Navy staff) concurred unanimously in my recommendation". Prior to that statement the Navy had provided you, on 13 June, schedule, cost, and funding requirements for the prototype program, as you had directed on 7 June. Not included in that package were complete program cost estimates prepared within NavAir which showed that the prototype plan made no sense. These data, needed for an intelligent decision, were not forwarded to you, because they had not been specifically requested, and some officers within the Navy felt that you might consider them an unwarranted expression of bias against the program. In that instance, I bypassed the "system" and wrote a memo directly to Mr. Warner, then SecNav, informing him of our frustrations, and the absurdity of the prototype plan with copies to those bypassed in my chain of command. Unfortunately, Mr. Warner was out of town, and my memo was withdrawn. On the morning of the 19 June hearing, however, Mr. Warner reviewed the total cost information, on the advice of the acting CNO, concurred in our recommendations, and proceeded to your office to advise you of the facts and the probable conflict which would develop if I were to be a witness as the committee had requested. Mr. Warner passed on your request to me that I not attend the hearing that day. A few days later I retired, and a few days after that I testified at a special hearing on the subject in accordance with an agreement between you and Senator Cannon. There was no reason whatsoever why you should not have had the benefit of all the data available on 13 June, which should certainly have dissuaded you from backing that particular program.


    2. With a committal to the TFX program made, the OSD position remained firm that the cost saving would remain despite a continuing technical degradation of the Navy version. Mr. McNamara then elected to believe program manager and contractor claims of forthcoming corrections rather than the"pessimistic" estimates made by Navy technical personnel. Dissent from that level was quashed by management levels in the Navy as well as by OSD staff while awaiting "hard evidence" that the F-111B was unsatisfactory. During part of that period, I was instructed to refrain from visits to the Pentagon for any purpose, and to refuse all requests for discussions with Congressional staffs.


    3. In the case of the Army/Marine HLH programs, the issues were grossly misrepresented to Mr. Packard by DDR&E, who in turn presumably was misinformed by his staff. This led to misrepresentation to the Congress and years of delay in the CH-53E Program. A claimed half billion dollar saving in that case was the apparent motivation to combine into a joint program two designs whose gross weights initially differed by a factor of about two to one. A reclama to the joint program decision eventually reached SecNav who then obtained promise of a review by Mr. Packard if a competition confirmed service estimates. The competition did, and a reversal of the joint program decision eventually resulted. Again, time has proved the claimed saving illusory.


    4. At the present time, I have been informed that Navy files and data relating to the F-18 project should not be made available to me in view of my lack of support for the program. Prior to that directive, I had prepared a brief study, intended for internal Navy distribution, which summarized some of the more pertinent technical and cost issues involved. That memorandum was stopped at the first link in the chain of command, depriving others of information which might have proved useful.


    5. One of the outgrowths of the well publicized DDR&E innovative prototyping concept was a Navy VTOL venture. Dr. Frosch, then ASN(R&D), took action on a program believing it was fully supported by the technical level in NavAir. A contract was signed before he became aware that technical level reservations had been suppressed. He later directed that in the future all major dissenting views be brought to his attention prior to decision time. He fully understood the hazards of decisions based on incomplete or erroneous data.


  3. I believe the issue is a serious one and deserves your consideration. At the present time there seems to be an inadequate check on OSD actions for a balanced output. You serve as judge and jury on a services budget, with Congressional action fairly well limited to killing an item, but not to substituting another.


  4. Back to the issues involved in the F-18 itself. Your statement contains a somewhat distorted version of the case. For example:


    1. The basis for developing VFAX requirements was not any expressed need by the Navy for an A-7 replacement, but rather an attempt to find something useful after OSD cut back on the planned F-14 buy. As you know, the early OSD alternatives of a modified F-15 or a new lightweight fighter had both been found to offer too little for too much. A VFAX held promise of being a better alternative than either an F-15N or a VFX, but no analysis, to my knowledge, ever showed it to be a superior solution to all known alternatives. As a fighter, the F-18 is about equivalent in overall effectiveness to the 1974 VFX, which was reported in NavAir analyses to be slightly inferior to the F-15N, which in turn had been found to be slightly inferior to an F-4J+. These results are consistent with and performed by the same NavAir analysts who documented the need for Sparrow on the F-18. The same methodology produced results proving the marked superiority of the F-14/Phoenix in the escort role, as well as the significant inferiority of a Sidewinder only equipped airplane. These general conclusions have not been challenged technically, as far as I know, and the F-14/Phoenix results have not been widely disseminated.


    2. The attack capability of the F-18 has not been well defined in public, and to the best of my knowledge, there is no rigorous Navy analysis to support the claim that the F-18 is clearly superior to the A-7, anymore than there is one to prove it superior to the F-4 as a fighter. Under pressure to keep the design small, cheap, and simple, the range capability was actually specified as to be consistent with that of the fighter, which in turn was specified at a level which was believed achievable in a 30,000 lb. class airplane. While the design, as with any recent Navy fighter, has some attack capability, the design is woefully short legged, at least as initially defined. Increased agility does little good if the aircraft cannot reach the target. A cost reduction study on the A-7E a few years ago considered a suggestion for fuel reduction. The suggestion was overwhelmingly rejected by those operating the aircraft, confirming the requirement, in general, of the SeaBased Strike Study in the early '60's which helped establish the original A-7 requirements. In my opinion, the range deficiency is a fatal flaw in the entire scheme. I can't believe the Navy wants to cut back its operational strike ability to the A-4 level, or worse. In an attempt to meet the new high performance attack requirements of the so called HIPASS study a few years ago, afterburning versions of the A-7 were studied by NavAir. Eventually, while combat performance was markedly improved, the cost in range was deemed unacceptable. The geography of the world has not changed, and logic says we certainly should not cut back on our strike radius. Another issue, not yet raised although well understood in the attack community, is whether increased agility in fact solves the problem of vulnerability to ground defenses. Those who believe one can outrun or dodge a well designed missile are badly misinformed.


    3. The conclusion as to the lack of space, manpower, and cost affordability of the F-14 is obviously one reached by OSD with no known substantiation. The Navy believed it affordable in 1969 when the contract was signed and the program justified to Congress. On a relative basis, the situation as to alternatives has not changed significantly.


    4. Any conclusion that the F-18 will meet a future threat even in the air combat area cannot be supported. It is probable that the claimed characteristics for the F-16 are now superior to those of the F-18 in this regard, and surely these could be exceeded in a new design optimized for this role by our potential enemies.


    5. The conclusion on page 5, that the unit cost of the F-14 under the "most optimistic assumptions" is $5M higher than the F-18, even for the 500 aircraft now discussed, is not at all consistent with the Navy estimates shown by Adm. Houser. He shows 500 F-18 aircraft, with no R&D, to cost about $4.3B, while 500 more F-14s cost about $5.6B. This means an average difference of only $2.6M. This creates a credibility gap of $1.2B.


    6. Adm. Houser's total acquisition and operating cost differential between his option IA and II thru 1990 only totals about $2.5B including development of a new attack airplane, about half of what you claim without that cost.


  5. As you might surmise, I also must disagree with virtually all of your conclusions on the program near the end of your statement. It seems to me that support is being given by those contractors who have something to gain, and by others who desire to reduce the capability of Naval aviation. While I agree that the rationalizations of the past fail to support the F-18, it is those same rationalizations which justified our current operating inventory. The Navy's track record should not be dismissed lightly; it is far better than for the OSD originated projects (TFX, HLH, COIN, TST). The charge of self interest against the opponents of the program is most disturbing. In my experience, I have found losing contractors in competitive situations to be disappointed but generally supportive of programs, providing the competition was fair, and the program enhancing of our defense posture. Protests and widespread opposition are sure signs of an ill-conceived program or an unfair acquisition process.


  6. Perhaps it is too much to hope that a project which makes no sense can be quashed by the power of logic.


/s/

G. A. Spangenberg




cc:
CNO
OP-05
AIR 00
Senator McClellan

No response from Clements: (or anyone else, for that matter--except that O5 asked if there had been a response from Clements)