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Exhibit VF-3. A retyped memo which is now unclassified. Comments added later are in italics.



From: RAEV
To: R
Subj: TFX - F-111A/B Source Selection; Record of (U)

Ref: See Enclosure (1)

Encl:
(1) List of References (U)
(2) Summary of Characteristics, RAEV:GS dtd 1-8-63 (SECRET)
(3)Summary of Significant Dates, RAEV:GS dtd 1-8-63 (SECRET)

  1. The source selection process for the F-111A/B has required more effort from industry and government than for any previous aircraft program with which the Navy has been associated. Trade publications and some segments of industry have blamed the delays on the Navy, and have indicated that the Navy held out until their contractor choice was made. The source selection process has been closely held, due to Air Force regulations governing such actions, preventing disclosure of the true facts involved. This memorandum, primarily for the record, provides a brief chronology of events in the process and the reasoning for the Navy's actions.


  2. The joint Air Force-Navy TFX project was officially started by a SecDef memorandum dated 1 September 1961 to the Air Force and Navy. It stated that "A single aircraft for both the Air Force tactical missions and the Navy fleet air defense mission will be undertaken," and that, "the Air Force shall proceed with the development of such an aircraft." This directive followed a review of service positions on the matter which had been presented by memoranda dated 22 August 1961, which in turn were the culmination of several months of studies and committee actions aimed at resolving the tactical air development program. CNO informed BuWeps of the decision and provided program guidance by reference (a).


  3. The TFX followed closely on two other multi-service programs, the "Tri-Service VTOL" and the "LOH," an Army helicopter. Other fairly recent Navy bi-service experience included the "Mohawk," started as a joint Army-Marine effort, and the X-15, a joint Air Force-Navy-NASA administered by the Air Force. In the future, the VAX is scheduled for administration by the Navy. The actions taken by the Navy in the TFX evaluation were based on this background, and were intended to:


    1. Minimize total manpower requirements, by eliminating duplication in detail evaluations.
    2. Give authority to administering service for contractor selection, since that service is charged with responsibility.
    3. Insure a satisfactory design, regardless of source.

    It is important to realize the difference in source selection procedures as practiced in the Air Force, and design competitions normally used for contractor selection in the Navy. The Air Force continually emphasizes that their procedure is "source selection" not "design selection." It is considered normal practice by the Air Force to make major changes in designs after a source is selected. The Navy selects a contractor on the basis of his design, and major changes are not contemplated. In fact, a requirement for a major change is used to eliminate designs from further consideration. Air Force methodology is quite formal with written criteria established by the Source Selection Board, against which an evaluation group rates all proposals numerically. Raw score ratings are adjusted in accordance with a previously prepared weighting schedule by the SSB. Voting members of the SSB, after a briefing by the Evaluation Group, prepare a written recommendation through the Air Force Command structure to the Air Force Council. The Council recommends a decision to the Chief of Staff and to the Secretary. All recommendations are closely held with no feedback to lower levels. The briefings remain basically unchanged from the SSB through the Secretarial level and necessarily contain no conclusions or recommendations, since the presenters are not privy to that information. In a Navy design competition on the other hand, experience is substituted for formality, designs are evaluated, conclusions drawn and recommendations presented by the working level through all review levels. The source decision is the responsibility of the Chief, BuWeps who normally obtains concurrences from OP-05 and the Secretarial level. Reversal of source decisions by higher authority had not occurred prior to the recent VTOL program. (Note: This was the X-22)

  4. Prior to the SecDef decision of 1 September 1961; the Air Force and Navy had been unable to agree on the characteristics of a design for both services, since no single aircraft could meet the stated requirements of both services. A design which would meet the Air Force requirements was not carrier suitable, while the proposed Navy carrier airplane was designed to lower speed requirements than those of the Air Force. Internal DOD studies by WSEG supplemented by NASA information were much more optimistic and indicated that a single airplane could meet both sets of requirements. The services considered these studies unrealistic. The SecDef decision paper ended the study phase by requesting a firm specification by 15 September for forwarding to industry on 1 October. An intensive effort by both services resulted in the Work Statement being approved by the SSB on 25 September 1961, and ready for pickup by the contractors on 1 October 1961. The Work Statement contained specification requirements for both Air Force and Navy versions, following the SecDef guidelines explicitly. As written, Navy carrier requirements were specified as fully operational from the CVA-43, and capable of emergency recovery from CVA-19. This capability was detailed as: zero knots wind over the deck for catapulting from the C11-1 catapult and arresting in the Mk 7-2 gear, and maximum folded length of 56 feet. Although these requirements were consistent with the Navy's stated requirements, DDR&E in their review of the Work Statement directed a relaxation of carrier requirements to fully operational from CVA-59 and emergency recovery on CVA-43. This was detailed as zero knots wind from the C7 catapult and 10 knots wind over the deck for arresting in the Mk 7-2 gear. The folded length requirement was deleted. These relaxations were vigorously opposed by the Navy as detailed in the enclosures to reference (b). The arresting requirement, in particular, was considered unsound, providing an insufficient design margin.


  5. Air Force Planning for the evaluation effort assumed Navy participation in all areas, with "Carrier Suitability" as an "area" in addition to "Technical," "Operational," "Logistics," and "Production." Navy evaluation personnel were to be at WPAFB for the entire period. With an additive point system used as a primary evaluation tool, the danger of an unacceptable design from the carrier standpoint receiving the highest score was obvious. Equally obvious was the impossibility of detailing the Navy's most experienced design engineers to ASD for the evaluation period scheduled for about six weeks. The position taken was detailed in the SSB Letter of Instruction to the Chairman, Evaluation Group as:

    6. "In order to prevent duplication and to promote efficiency in the evaluation process, the Navy will restrict its participation to determining carrier compatibility, its unique field of competence, and to providing consultive services. Quantitative weight and performance data developed by the Evaluation Group will be utilized by the Navy as required. The Navy will be furnished three (3) complete copies of proposals for review at the Bureau of Naval Weapons. A qualitative analysis and determination as to overall carrier compatibility will be furnished the Chairman, Evaluation Group by the Navy Program Officer for incorporation in the evaluation report. The Navy will also review team and area results and indicate concurrences or objections within any reasonable time schedule if requested by the Chairman, Evaluation Group. It is the intent of the Navy that the Air Force administer the Source Selection process with the least possible interference (from the Navy)."

    Details of the evaluation procedures and responsibilities were given to cognizant activities in BuWeps by reference (d). Basically, the Navy's evaluation effort was reported outside the Air Force point score system except for the Navy AMCS. BuWeps was thus able to inform the Air Force as to the acceptability or unacceptability of each design as a naval weapon. It was considered imperative that the design, as opposed to the source, be acceptable before the Navy became committed to the program. The same general philosophy has been followed throughout the source selection process.

  6. After a shorter than normal design period, six bidders submitted proposals on 6 December 1961 and made oral presentations on 12-13 December. The Air Force, attempting compliance with SecDef's directive for a 1 Feb. 1962 contract date, scheduled the evaluation to be complete by 17 January. The Navy evaluation results were provided to the Air Force on schedule by reference (c). As noted in part in that document there were several problems encountered:
    1. Weight estimates initially provided by the USAF appeared unreliable, forcing a last minute Navy weight estimation effort. These estimates were then coordinated with the USAF.
    2. No mission performance data had been completed by the USAF by the date that Navy comments were due. This made it impossible to reach a conclusion on the overall acceptability of the design.
    3. Four of the designs were based on a GE engine, which, although listed in the Work Statement, was not considered capable of development in time to meet the airplane schedule. The GE engine characteristics were much more optimistic than either of the other two engines listed, and permitted designers to approach more closely the weight limits listed in the SecDef decision paper. The problem, predicted when the power plant portion of the Work Statement was prepared, was not judged severe by the Air Force. Alternate engine studies had been requested, and an engine selection independent of airplane selection was planned. From the Navy standpoint, an engine selection prior to the airplane competition would have been preferable.

    Of the six designs evaluated, two, Boeing and NAA, were reported as "Acceptable, with changes," and the other four as "Unacceptable without major change." Because of the listing of the GE engine in the Work Statement, the use of that engine in a design, while unsatisfactory, could not be considered disqualifying.

  7. On 19 January 1962, the SSB met, heard a presentation of evaluation results, and prepared their recommendations. The Evaluation Group had reported none of the designs to be acceptable without substantial change, but that two, Boeing and General Dynamics were significantly better than the rest. After weighting the scores, and considering the Navy evaluation data, the SSB unanimously recommended Boeing as the source, with the airplane to be changed as necessary to accommodate the larger engine and to correct other deficiencies. [Despite concurrences through the Air Force and Navy commands, the decision was made at the Secretarial level to extend the competition on a partially funded basis between Boeing and General Dynamics.] [ Not quite accurate. McClellan hearings revealed that the Air Council recommended Boeing and GD be continued in competition. Chiefs of Staff and Secretarial level then concurred. Navy member of SSB (Adm. Ashworth) was not informed. GS 1990] Contracts were let with each contractor on 1 February 1962 for $1.0 M. for further development of their proposals.


  8. Under ground rules similar to the first evaluation effort, the new proposals submitted on 2 April 1962 were reviewed and results reported to the Air Force by reference (e), meeting the 2 May schedule. Neither of the two designs was acceptable, but Boeing again was the better of the two. The SSB, meeting on 14 May 1962, recommended Boeing as a source, but recognized that neither design was acceptable as proposed. The designs failed to meet requirements by a larger degree than on the initial submission. These facts were brought to the attention of CNO by reference (f), and were subsequently discussed at the Secretarial Briefing on 28 May 1962. It was apparent to the Navy that the requirements were such that no single design could meet them. The only real solutions were either to relax requirements or enlarge the differences between versions. The Air Force considered that all deficiencies were correctable, although specifics on how this was to be accomplished were not presented. References (g) and (h) detailed the decision to allow both contractors approximately three (3) weeks to determine divergence required between versions to allow correction of Navy deficiencies. This exercise ignored the fact that the Air Force was reporting the dash distance on their Lo-Lo-Hi mission to be 142 and 135 miles instead of the required 200. Correction of this would, of course, have a significant effect on the basic airplane.


  9. On 5 June a formal briefing was given each contractor to explain the third phase, although an informal meeting at the SPO had given each a go-ahead on 2 June. Each contractor was asked to provide solutions to Navy deficiencies, and to do the same while reducing the weight to 55000 lb. The second request appeared to ask for the impossible and obviously was not originated by the Navy. Divergence to take advantage of the Navy's lower flight strength requirement was encouraged at this time. While this effort was underway, two SecDef memos, references (i) and (j), were received. The first approved the three (3) week study effort, requested specific information on a number of suggested weight reduction items and reiterated the guidelines that divergence should be minimized. None of the weight reduction schemes had merit, as detailed in an internal memo, reference (k).
    10. [GAS: No Navy representation]

  10. On 15 June, the two contractors made oral presentations at ASD, followed by an SSB meeting on 20 June. The five days permitted something less than a complete evaluation of the proposals, particularly when the contractors' data submissions were incomplete. Boeing surprised by submitting a new design for both Air Force and Navy with a 15% increase in wing area over their previous proposal. It was obvious that this redesign effort had covered most of the period since the April submission. General Dynamics submitted preliminary data on six possible Navy configurations, leaving the Air Force version unchanged. Their submission reflected the short time available for this design effort. The SSB Ashworth) was not informed. GS 1990] Contracts were let with each contractor on 1 February 1962 for $1.0 M. for further development of their proposals.


  11. Under ground rules similar to the first evaluation effort, the new proposals submitted on 2 April 1962 were reviewed and results reported to the Air Force by reference (e), meeting the 2 May schedule. Neither of the two designs was acceptable, but Boeing again was the better of the two. The SSB, meeting on 14 May 1962, recommended Boeing as a source, but recognized that neither design was acceptable as proposed. The designs failed to meet requirements by a larger degree than on the initial submission. These facts were brought to the attention of CNO by reference (f), and were subsequently discussed at the Secretarial Briefing on 28 May 1962. It was apparent to the Navy that the requirements were such that no single design could meet them. The only real solutions were either to relax requirements or enlarge the differences between versions. The Air Force considered that all deficiencies were correctable, although specifics on how this was to be accomplished were not presented. References (g) and (h) detailed the decision to allow both contractors approximately three (3) weeks to determine divergence required between versions to allow correction of Navy deficiencies. This exercise ignored the fact that the Air Force was reporting the dash distance on their Lo-Lo-Hi mission to be 142 and 135 miles instead of the required 200. Correction of this would, of course, have a significant effect on the basic airplane.


  12. On 5 June a formal briefing was given each contractor to explain the third phase, although an informal meeting at the SPO had given each a go-ahead on 2 June. Each contractor was asked to provide solutions to Navy deficiencies, and to do the same while reducing the weight to 55000 lb. The second request appeared to ask for the impossible and obviously was not originated by the Navy. Divergence to take advantage of the Navy's lower flight strength requirement was encouraged at this time. While this effort was underway, two SecDef memos, references (i) and (j), were received. The first approved the three (3) week study effort, requested specific information on a number of suggested weight reduction items and reiterated the guidelines that divergence should be minimized. None of the weight reduction schemes had merit, as detailed in an internal memo, reference (k).


  13. On 15 June, the two contractors made oral presentations at ASD, followed by an SSB meeting on 20 June. The five days permitted something less than a complete evaluation of the proposals, particularly when the contractors' data submissions were incomplete. Boeing surprised by submitting a new design for both Air Force and Navy with a 15% increase in wing area over their previous proposal. It was obvious that this redesign effort had covered most of the period since the April submission. General Dynamics submitted preliminary data on six possible Navy configurations, leaving the Air Force version unchanged. Their submission reflected the short time available for this design effort. The SSB Ashworth) was not informed. GS 1990] Contracts were let with each contractor on 1 February 1962 for $1.0 M. for further development of their proposals.


  14. Under ground rules similar to the first evaluation effort, the new proposals submitted on 2 April 1962 were reviewed and results reported to the Air Force by reference (e), meeting the 2 May schedule. Neither of the two designs was acceptable, but Boeing again was the better of the two. The SSB, meeting on 14 May 1962, recommended Boeing as a source, but recognized that neither design was acceptable as proposed. The designs failed to meet requirements by a larger degree than on the initial submission. These facts were brought to the attention of CNO by reference (f), and were subsequently discussed at the Secretarial Briefing on 28 May 1962. It was apparent to the Navy that the requirements were such that no single design could meet them. The only real solutions were either to relax requirements or enlarge the differences between versions. The Air Force considered that all deficiencies were correctable, although specifics on how this was to be accomplished were not presented. References (g) and (h) detailed the decision to allow both contractors approximately three (3) weeks to determine divergence required between versions to allow correction of Navy deficiencies. This exercise ignored the fact that the Air Force was reporting the dash distance on their Lo-Lo-Hi mission to be 142 and 135 miles instead of the required 200. Correction of this would, of course, have a significant effect on the basic airplane.


  15. On 5 June a formal briefing was given each contractor to explain the third phase, although an informal meeting at the SPO had given each a go-ahead on 2 June. Each contractor was asked to provide solutions to Navy deficiencies, and to do the same while reducing the weight to 55000 lb. The second request appeared to ask for the impossible and obviously was not originated by the Navy. Divergence to take advantage of the Navy's lower flight strength requirement was encouraged at this time. While this effort was underway, two SecDef memos, references (i) and (j), were received. The first approved the three (3) week study effort, requested specific information on a number of suggested weight reduction items and reiterated the guidelines that divergence should be minimized. None of the weight reduction schemes had merit, as detailed in an internal memo, reference (k).


  16. On 15 June, the two contractors made oral presentations at ASD, followed by an SSB meeting on 20 June. The five days permitted something less than a complete evaluation of the proposals, particularly when the contractors' data submissions were incomplete. Boeing surprised by submitting a new design for both Air Force and Navy with a 15% increase in wing area over their previous proposal. It was obvious that this redesign effort had covered most of the period since the April submission. General Dynamics submitted preliminary data on six possible Navy configurations, leaving the Air Force version unchanged. Their submission reflected the short time available for this design effort. The SSB Ashworth) was not informed. GS 1990] Contracts were let with each contractor on 1 February 1962 for $1.0 M. for further development of their proposals.


  17. Under ground rules similar to the first evaluation effort, the new proposals submitted on 2 April 1962 were reviewed and results reported to the Air Force by reference (e), meeting the 2 May schedule. Neither of the two designs was acceptable, but Boeing again was the better of the two. The SSB, meeting on 14 May 1962, recommended Boeing as a source, but recognized that neither design was acceptable as proposed. The designs failed to meet requirements by a larger degree than on the initial submission. These facts were brought to the attention of CNO by reference (f), and were subsequently discussed at the Secretarial Briefing on 28 May 1962. It was apparent to the Navy that the requirements were such that no single design could meet them. The only real solutions were either to relax requirements or enlarge the differences between versions. The Air Force considered that all deficiencies were correctable, although specifics on how this was to be accomplished were not presented. References (g) and (h) detailed the decision to allow both contractors approximately three (3) weeks to determine divergence required between versions to allow correction of Navy deficiencies. This exercise ignored the fact that the Air Force was reporting the dash distance on their Lo-Lo-Hi mission to be 142 and 135 miles instead of the required 200. Correction of this would, of course, have a significant effect on the basic airplane.


  18. On 5 June a formal briefing was given each contractor to explain the third phase, although an informal meeting at the SPO had given each a go-ahead on 2 June. Each contractor was asked to provide solutions to Navy deficiencies, and to do the same while reducing the weight to 55000 lb. The second request appeared to ask for the impossible and obviously was not originated by the Navy. Divergence to take advantage of the Navy's lower flight strength requirement was encouraged at this time. While this effort was underway, two SecDef memos, references (i) and (j), were received. The first approved the three (3) week study effort, requested specific information on a number of suggested weight reduction items and reiterated the guidelines that divergence should be minimized. None of the weight reduction schemes had merit, as detailed in an internal memo, reference (k).


  19. On 15 June, the two contractors made oral presentations at ASD, followed by an SSB meeting on 20 June. The five days permitted something less than a complete evaluation of the proposals, particularly when the contractors' data submissions were incomplete. Boeing surprised by submitting a new design for both Air Force and Navy with a 15% increase in wing area over their previous proposal. It was obvious that this redesign effort had covered most of the period since the April submission. General Dynamics submitted preliminary data on six possible Navy configurations, leaving the Air Force version unchanged. Their submission reflected the short time available for this design effort. The SSB unanimously recommended Boeing as the source, with the airplane to be changed as necessary to accommodate the larger engine and to correct other deficiencies. Despite concurrences through the Air Force and Navy commands, the decision was made at the Secretarial level to extend the competition on a partially funded basis between Boeing and General Dynamics. [We obviously seriously underestimated the incompetence of the Air Force in making rational design compromises. GS 1990] Not quite accurate. McClellan hearings revealed that the Air Council recommended Boeing and GD be continued in competition. Chiefs of Staff and Secretarial level then concurred. Navy member of SSB (Adm.Ashworth) was not informed. GS 1990] Contracts were let with each contractor on 1 February 1962 for $1.0 M. for further development of their proposals.


  20. Under ground rules similar to the first evaluation effort, the new proposals submitted on 2 April 1962 were reviewed and results reported to the Air Force by reference (e), meeting the 2 May schedule. Neither of the two designs was acceptable, but Boeing again was the better of the two. The SSB, meeting on 14 May 1962, recommended Boeing as a source, but recognized that neither design was acceptable as proposed. The designs failed to meet requirements by a larger degree than on the initial submission. These facts were brought to the attention of CNO by reference (f), and were subsequently discussed at the Secretarial Briefing on 28 May 1962. It was apparent to the Navy that the requirements were such that no single design could meet them. The only real solutions were either to relax requirements or enlarge the differences between versions. The Air Force considered that all deficiencies were correctable, although specifics on how this was to be accomplished were not presented. References (g) and (h) detailed the decision to allow both contractors approximately three (3) weeks to determine divergence required between versions to allow correction of Navy deficiencies. This exercise ignored the fact that the Air Force was reporting the dash distance on their Lo-Lo-Hi mission to be 142 and 135 miles instead of the required 200. Correction of this would, of course, have a significant effect on the basic airplane.


  21. On 5 June a formal briefing was given each contractor to explain the third phase, although an informal meeting at the SPO had given each a go-ahead on 2 June. Each contractor was asked to provide solutions to Navy deficiencies, and to do the same while reducing the weight to 55000 lb. The second request appeared to ask for the impossible and obviously was not originated by the Navy. Divergence to take advantage of the Navy's lower flight strength requirement was encouraged at this time. While this effort was underway, two SecDef memos, references (i) and (j), were received. The first approved the three (3) week study effort, requested specific information on a number of suggested weight reduction items and reiterated the guidelines that divergence should be minimized. None of the weight reduction schemes had merit, as detailed in an internal memo, reference (k).


  22. On 15 June, the two contractors made oral presentations at ASD, followed by an SSB meeting on 20 June. The five days permitted something less than a complete evaluation of the proposals, particularly when the contractors' data submissions were incomplete. Boeing surprised by submitting a new design for both Air Force and Navy with a 15% increase in wing area over their previous proposal. It was obvious that this redesign effort had covered most of the period since the April submission. General Dynamics submitted preliminary data on six possible Navy configurations, leaving the Air Force version unchanged. Their submission reflected the short time available for this design effort. The SSB again unanimously selected Boeing as the source, but pointed out that time had not permitted a complete evaluation. Although the changes made to the Boeing design improved the Navy version, they were expected to degrade the Air Force's Lo-Lo- Hi mission. No explanation for this phenomenon was made. Since General Dynamics had not changed their AF design, their Lo-Lo-Hi radius from round #2 was again quoted. After a briefing to the Secretaries, a decision was reached and confirmed by a SecAF memo to the SSB dated 29 June 1962 to continue the competition through one more full round, with each contractor to be given an additional $2.5 M. The purpose was stated to be to allow each contractor adequate time to establish his design in sufficient detail to enable more precise service assessment and to reconcile disparities between the cost quotes and cost standards. Both contractors had been bidding well below the "standards," both on the fixed price incentive RDT&E and production lots. A 60 day design period to be followed by a 45 day evaluation was announced in a press release dated 30 June 1962.


  23. The fourth round was apparently to define designs in detail, and so was regarded as a design competition. The Navy collected the design criticisms from the June submissions and forwarded them to ASD by reference (1), where they were combined with USAF criticisms and given to each contractor in a briefing on 10 July 1962. Reference (1) informed the Air Force that on this round the Navy would check the weight and mission performance for its versions. This step was taken only after the previous three rounds had shown sufficient inconsistencies in Air Force figures that confidence was lacking. Also, at the 10 July 1962 briefing, the Air Force announced that wind tunnel models would be required from each contractor in order that the government could run tunnel tests presumably to determine drag levels. Such a naive approach to the performance prediction problem did not inspire confidence. Each contractor was told in detail what Navy weight and performance estimates had been on his design, and the levels we would accept in the final round. On our figures we informed him that we would accept .5 hr. in lieu of 1.0 hour on the 750 mi. mission, and a buffet limit of 1.7g rather than 2.0g. Other design requirement relaxations were also listed in an attempt to produce useful designs from the exercise. No relaxation of Air Force requirements was indicated to the bidders. Of great concern to the Navy personnel involved in monitoring the program was the rather obvious discrepancy in Air Force radius between the two contractors. General Dynamics was working on the results from round two, (135 mi. dash) while Boeing had been told his radius was "satisfactory." (Checked at 185.) Eventually, the Air Force dropped the wind tunnel test plan as impracticable, but did not resolve the radius inconsistency.


  24. The fourth round design proposals were submitted on 10 September 1962 with a contractor oral briefing held 11 September 1962. The Air Force had supplementary studies submitted later on a greater air-to-air capability desired by TAC, as well as contractor studies showing the increased weapon effectiveness of his TFX over service types. The Navy did not evaluate these reports. The increased air-to-air capability requirements were considered by the Air Council separately and rejected "at this time." Because of the air-to-air study, as well as other technical evaluation problems, the Air Force slipped the completion schedule from a SSB meeting on 23 October to 2 November 1962. Official word was received too late for Navy to take advantage of the increased time in its evaluation so the original deadline of 15 October was met with reference (m). In this, BuWeps reported both designs as acceptable, and expressed the opinion that there was no significant preference between the two designs as submitted. The Boeing design had an advantage in carrier suitability and time on station. These are significant items. In order to save weight, Boeing elected to show a reduced design speed envelope for the Navy version. If the airplane had been procured, it is probable that the envelope would have been expanded. Boeing had also elected to use a large amount of titanium in the wing center section to save weight. Although acceptable, this material usage is less conservative than using steel and aluminum. If the Boeing design had been selected, it is probable that the titanium structure would have been retained. The phrase, "no significant preference," used in the BuWeps evaluation report to ASD has been interpreted by some to mean that the Navy either had no choice, or was unwilling to express it. What was actually meant was that the Navy could, and would, support any strong preference of the USAF, since both designs were now in the "acceptable" stage. The Navy members and alternates on the SSB, in conference prior to the meeting, were unanimous in their selection of Boeing as the Navy choice. The voting member on the board was the spokesman for the Navy in the official proceedings. The unanimous recommendation of the SSB in their letter of 2 November reflected this choice as did the BuWeps and CNO endorsements forwarding it to the SecNav, references (n) and (o). Any other interpretation of the facts is without merit.


  25. For reference purposes, enclosure (2) lists a number of characteristics for the two designs as they progressed through the four phases, and enclosure (3) tabulates some of the key dates. The source selection phase of TFX ended with the press release on 14 November 1962 that General Dynamics had been selected as the contractor to develop the F-111A/B. The BuWeps is cooperating with th Air Force in developing firm specifications for the project, and expects to achieve a useful naval fighter. [We obviously seriously underestimated the incompetence of the Air Force in making rational design compromises. GS 1990.] The Boeing design would have been a better point from which to start.


  26. There are lessons to be learned from the experiences of this program. In general, the Navy method of handling a design competition and making a source decision is considered much sounder than the procedures used in the TFX program. The lack of open conclusions and recommendations from one level to the next is considered the most basic fault of the USAF system.

Enclosure (1)



LIST OF REFERENCES

  1. CNO Secret ltr to BuWeps, OP-506/pep, Serial 006045P50 dated 6 Sep 1961 (BuWeps Control # K 14915)
  2. BuWeps Secret Memo, CD-2:WCB dated 6 Nov 1961 (BuWeps Control #K18586)
  3. BuWeps Secret ltr to ASD, RAEV:GS dated 8 Jan 1962, Serial 0040
  4. BuWeps Conf Memo RAEV:GS dated 15 Dec 1961
  5. BuWeps Secret ltr to ASD, RAEV:FS dated 1 May 1962, Serial 001090
  6. BuWeps Secret 1st End. To CNO, RA:LSC dated 16 May 1962.
  7. ASAF (R&E) Secret Memo for ASN (R&D) dated 1 June 1962
  8. SecAF and SecNav Secret Memo for SecDef dated 1 June 1962
  9. SecDef Secret Memo for SecAF and SecNav, SecDef Control 3491 dated 9 June 1962
  10. SecDef Secret Memo for SecAF and SecNav (enclosing Staff Study) Control 3492 dated 9 June 1962
  11. BuWeps Secret Memo RAEV to R dated 12 June 1962
  12. BuWeps Secret ltr to ASD, RAEV:GS, 001616 dated 9 July 1962
  13. BuWeps Secret ltr to ASD, 002387, dated 15 Oct 1962
  14. BuWeps Secret 1st End. To CNO, RAEV:GS 002630 dated 6 Nov 1962
  15. CNO Secret 2nd End. To SecNav, 007PO5 dated 8 Nov 1962