Exhibit VF-4. A memo unclassified on 22 June 1973. SER 01551 originally. Also follow up memo.

1.       In reference (a) the Secretary of Defense requested a review of the TFX program by 15 February. Reference (b) outlined actions taken by DDR&E to comply with the request, including the formation of a team headed by Mr. Joe Jones and including Mr. S.O. Perry and CDR Longquest which is scheduled to complete its report on 8 February. Reference (c) requested that the Navy response to reference (a) be furnished the Secretary of the Navy by 7 February so that it could be made available to OSD by 10 February 1964. Reference (c) also provided guidelines on the material to be covered in the reply. Informal requests have been made that the Bureau of Naval Weapons make its share of the data available to the Chief of Naval Operations on 5 February.

2.       Enclosure (1) contains a weight and performance review updated over the 22 January status report as requested by reference (c). A copy of these data is also being provided the joint team. Enclosure (2) contains information on carrier modifications required if the F-111B is to be fully operational on CVA-41 and subsequent as requested by reference (c). These data are necessarily based on assumptions as to the future weight and performance of the F-111B. Enclosure (3) contains a statement of the actions being taken to control the weight of the Phoenix missile system. Enclosure (4) describes the air to ground capability of the F-111B. Enclosure (5) provides a weight summary of the TF30 engine.

3.       The Bureau of Naval Weapons review of all government responsible items that have contributed to increased weight has commenced and will be completed by 24 February. It is expected that a substantial amount of weight can be saved through redesign of the MAU-48 launcher.

4.       Continuing requests are being received for absolute limits of acceptability in each of many weight and performance areas. Although some absolute limits can be established, a very real danger exists that a design meeting each limit of acceptability, individually, can still be an unacceptable weapons system when considered collectively. As reported in reference (d), the Bureau of Naval Weapons has initiated an operational or cost effectiveness analysis on the F-111B together with alternative programs. This analysis, scheduled for completion by 15 April is expected to provide a sound base for program actions.

5.       With the exception of the OPNAV Sea Based Strike Study, the Bureau of Naval Weapons is not aware of any study attempting to justify only twelve (12) F-111B aircraft per carrier. On the contrary, Bureau studies have consistently assumed two squadrons of twelve planes each; this two squadron assumption is supported in general terms by the OPNAV "Naval Aircraft Study," July 1962 and the supporting Bureau work on this study described in BuWeps Report No. R-5-63-8. Any study justifying reduction in this number will be complex and time consuming, and the authoritativeness of the results will depend primarily upon the validity of the assumptions used. Such a study is included in the cost effectiveness analysis described in the preceding paragraph. It is axiomatic that any reduction in the range and endurance of the fighter or effectiveness of its missile system will tend to increase the numbers required. Consideration must also be given in this regard to the necessity of increasing total fighter effectiveness to match the increasing threat with which it must cope.

6.       Reference (c) also requests specific recommendations aimed at strengthening the TFX program and insuring that the weapon system delivered to the fleet will offer the best balance between technical risk, operational capability, and cost. It is evident from the data of enclosure (1) that major changes in the Navy version of the TFX are necessary if the airplane is to be an acceptable weapon system. The SPO has been requested to direct the contractor to provide information as soon as possible on the redesign necessary to meet specification requirements. Until this information is available, and the cost effectiveness analysis mentioned above is completed, any further program recommendations would be premature.

1/5/64

Now Unclassified memo:

11 Feb 1964 

1.       Deficiencies in the F-111B at present state of development were presented in reference (a). Reference (a) also advised that the SPO had been requested to direct the contractor to submit proposed action to improve the F-111B to meet Navy requirements and to consider redesign where necessary.

2.       Pending receipt and analysis of the contractors proposed action, it is recommended that the Navy R&D aircraft be delayed until such time as an acceptable design can be produced.                                                            

                                                                                      K. S. Masterson

Copy to: CNM