Exhibit VF-5. A retyped memo, unclassified 6/22/73. ( Notes by GAS in italics)

RAEV:GS

14 August 1964

From: RAEV

To: R

Subj: F-111 Design Review

1. In reference (a), the Bureau of Naval Weapons reported on the status of the F-111B and reached the conclusions that major changes were required to make the airplane acceptable. (Note: This letter not in the record. Although written, it was apparently withdrawn.) After reviewing the facts, the CNO recommended to the Secretary of the Navy that work on the F-111B be stopped pending a determination of corrective action required. In a joint report to the Secretary of Defense, reference (b), the problem was discussed and a decision reached to continue the program as scheduled but with increased attention to weigh reduction. Also recognizing a possibility that the Navy version could not be made acceptable within the constraints of the program, a decision was also made to:

   "e. Immediately institute design studies to provide options and a "fall-back" design for the F-111B that will assure meeting Navy requirements with a margin for growth. Prepare analyses of the options in terms of schedule and program impact."

2. The contractor, General Dynamics, under the direction of the Air Force System Project Office (SPO) has concentrated his efforts on weight reduction programs, first "WIP," (Weight Improvement Program) then "SWIP," (Super Weight Improvement Program). The Navy has cooperated in such efforts to the maximum practicable extent, while also attempting to convince both the SPO and the contractor that the problem was real, and would not be solved without a major design effort. Reference (c) packaged weight and performance data together with a cost-effectiveness summary for delivery to the Commander, AFSC at a status meeting at General Dynamics on 7 May. It was apparent at that time that little attention was being given the "fall-back" design, with both the Air Force and contractor expressing the opinion that SWIP would solve the problem; aided, if necessary, with an achievement of a higher maximum lift coefficient. In compliance with requests made at the 7 May meeting, reference (d) put together a more comprehensive summary of the Navy weight position for transmittal to AFSC and SPO.
   



3. On 8 June, the contractor presented to the SPO and provided data to the Bureau on his solutions to the Navy Problem. On 9 June, he presented the results at the Executive Management Review (EMR) together with his normal status report. Five configurations were discussed:
   



1. Configuration A. The current airplane after SWIP with only minor changes in "commonality." A saving of 4644 lb. from the base weight of 46310 lb. was claimed. Costs were stated to be within the current scope of the program.
2. Configuration C. In addition to the changes of A, 2050 lb. were saved by reducing the design Mach number, deleting the weapons bay and capsule, and incorporating new, lower design Mach engines. Part count "commonality" was reduced from 78.8% to 57.4%, and costs increased by 45M, "R&D,", and 260 M "Total."
3. Configuration E. This design saved another 987 lb. by reducing the wing strength on the Navy airplane and increasing the thickness of the horizontal tail. Part count "commonality" dropped 2.6 points to 54.8% and costs were quoted as increasing 53M and 344M for "R&D" and "Total."
4. Configuration X. A substantially new Navy airplane designed by General Dynamics with wing and tail planforms held. Part count "commonality" was reduced to 28.1% while the changes in costs were given as 128M and 480M. The weight was quoted as one pound more than E.
5. Configuration Y. An airplane with a new Navy fuselage and landing gear designed by Grumman. Part count "commonality" was given by General Dynamics as 29.4%, the weight was quoted as the same as "E" and costs the same as "X."
   



4. The basic information presented was inadequate for evaluation purposes. All the data on Configurations A, C, and E were contained in one 56 page report. Configuration X, a new airplane, was described in a 47 page report. Only configuration "Y" was presented in anything approaching the expected depth. The Grumman report on that design was accompanied by a short General Dynamics critique which tended to becloud its status. The total cost data provided are those figures noted above, given at the EMR, while no schedule information was made available. Requests for specific addition information were made both officially to the SPO and informally to the contractor. The latter channel was the most effective with the SPO providing part of the same information from the contractor on a delayed basis. Significant developments during the initial data acquisition period from 8 June to 2 July included:
   



1. Lift data used for the EMR presentation on 9 June differed from those used in the technical reports submitted on 8 June. At a meeting at the SPO on 24 June, the contractor provided test data on a revised high lift configuration. He confirmed at a meeting on 1 July in the Bureau that the new configuration was considered firm. The inboard two sections of the slat are increased in chord from 12% to 15%, the Kreuger flap on the glove is eliminated, a section of the glove translates forward 14 inches and rotates, the slats are extended inboard to the sides of the nacelle, and the gap between flap sections is reduced from 12 to 7 inches. The contractor also confirmed that the slat chord increase involves a front spar relocation inboard in the wing, while the flap gap change involves actuator cutouts in the rear spar. Weight and fuel changes involved were not reflected in any other reports.
2. In the high lift meeting on 24 June, it appeared to the Bureau representative that the contractor had also restored the missiles to their original positions on the wings. The contractor at the 1 July meeting, however, stated that the "current" airplane is that described as Configuration A, with the external missiles on the nacelles.
3. In reviewing the revised configurations, basic discrepancies in design speeds and load factors were revealed between the "current" airplane and that described in the specifications. For example, a loiter condition maneuver load factor of 6.5 g is required by specification, but the contractor (with SPO concurrence expressed in their message (424-6-176) is actually providing 5.0 g. Speeds described in structural specification (FZM -12 - 0956) as "maximum attainable" have been reduced arbitrarily by the contractor to lower values. In the 1 July meeting, the contractor could not define the structural design envelopes of the "current" airplane, much less those of any of the new configurations. The stability limits are likewise not defined. Information on the current airplane was promised by the contractor (Configuration A), but no attempt was to be made to define the design envelopes on the other configurations.
4. The "loiter" condition was in the process of changing. For the last year, all aerodynamic calculations have been based on a 20^o sweep with a 11.4^o flap deflection. The contractor's "Structural Criteria", however, has shown the condition as 15^o sweep with the same flap setting. In the 1 July meeting, the contractor reported that stability considerations required either a change from the 20^o-11.4^o condition or a "fix" to the airplane. A change to 5^o flap deflection appeared to be the most likely, although other conditions including sweeps of 20^o and 25^o with no flaps were still being considered by the contractor.
   



5. The preceding paragraph notes only a few of the problems with which the technical evaluators were faced in this exercise. The extremely fluid state of the basic airplane configuration at this stage of development is unprecedented in the Bureau's experience. Although it was known that Air Force procedures encouraged such design flexibility at the source selection stage, it was not known that the fluidity continued throughout development. Based on the data then available, a review of the five configurations was conducted.
   



6. The evaluation task of examining the five configurations followed normal Bureau procedures as far as possible. The principal task was to determine the acceptability of the various configurations as naval weapons. Two of the models were eliminated almost immediately:
   



1. Configuration X - This design was obviously inferior to the Grumman Y design. Although General Dynamics showed the two to be in the same weight and "commonality" class, and with an identical cost impact, the data available made these conclusions quite questionable. The Y design retained the entire outer wing and tail, of the basic F-111, held the basic engine (modifying only the afterburner and nozzle) and thus should have had cost advantages over "X." A cursory review showed about a 2000 lb. weight advantage for the "Y" as well. The contractor recommended against "spending much time" on Configuration X, recognizing that the design had little merit.
2. Configuration E - This model reduced the maneuver strength level to nominal values of 6.0g clean and 4.0 for the loiter case. Actually, the restrictions shown are more severe since a "bucket" down to 5.0g occurs in the strength envelope at about M 1.0. This level of strength might be tolerable for the primary CAP fighter mission, but would be unacceptable for the secondary air-to-ground missions. Since the strength change is the source of the principal weight reduction from Configuration C, a correction to increase strength makes the design revert back to "C."
   



7. The weight, performance, stability and structural data generated on the basis of the 2 July configuration were taken to the SPO on 14-15 July for a coordination meeting with the Air Force. The announced purpose of defining differences between the SPO and BUWEPS estimates was not achieved. The SPO apparently had conducted no evaluation of Configurations C, E, X or Y, and had only limited weight information available on Configuration A. Navy results were made available to the SPO. On 20 July, SPO and AFSC representatives met with BUWEPS personnel in RA-2. In this meeting the SPO stated that their evaluation had been conducted on some configuration other than that described in the contractor's reports and as confirmed by the SPO. The SPO stated that the loiter configuration had been changed to 26^o sweep with no flap. ON 21 July, the contractor presented more data to the Bureau, confirmed the new loiter configuration, and reached agreement with Bureau's engineers that the takeoff and landing configuration would be 19^o with missiles in the bay and 22^o-- 23^o with no missiles. These changes required almost a complete repeat of the review already completed. Revised data were put together in a briefing for SECNAV on 24 July 1964, which also included the cost effectiveness study previously completed by R-5. A condensation of the weight and performance portion of the briefing was assembled and presented at the Executive Management Review (EMR) on 28 July 1964. At that time, the SPO and contractor presented data which differed significantly from the Navy figures. In part, the differences were due to a reversion to a 16^o sweep condition for landing and takeoff (on the assumption that the balance problem would be solved) and to a 20^o sweep, 5^o flap condition for loiter in order to improve maneuverability.



8. The enclosures to this memorandum present the evaluation data consistent with that given by the Navy at the EMR. Enclosure (1) covers the weight and balance picture, Enclosure (2) the performance, while Enclosure (3) contains an analysis of the stability and control situation. Enclosure (4) is a summary of the cost effectiveness study completed in April and updated with an appendix showing the effect of cost increases over those used in the basic study. Enclosure (5) contains the summary table from the EMR briefing, other summary type information developed during the review, and a "conclusion" chart prepared for, but not used at, the EMR which was consistent with the "Conclusions" presented to SECNAV on 24 July, and earlier to ASN(R&D) on 18 July.



9. The "Conclusions" are discussed in more detail below:



1. Configurations A and C are unacceptable, due to their weight and performance in reference to the requirements of the specification and the original SOR. Configuration A is slightly heavier and Configuration C slightly lighter than was predicted in February for the best that could be done without major redesign. There has been some misunderstanding of the relationship between the Navy's February analysis and the SWIP program. Some have questioned our conclusion that the "A" configuration is no better than in February when the contractor shows a 4000 lb. weight reduction. It must be noted that both the February and current analyses are concerned with a projected fleet airplane. The SWIP program, while responsible for weight reductions, is no better than it was anticipated to be in solving the total problem. Catapulting and arresting winds required have increased for Configuration A despite the new high lift arrangement. The increased sweep required for balance has offset the lift improvement. Similarly, single engine climb has decreased despite the better lift and use of a lesser flap setting. With 26^o sweep, the loiter speed is increased desirably, but the load factor at buffet onset is reduced. Acceleration to supersonic speeds is worse because of the higher drag missile installation and thrust loss associated with the fixed shroud exhaust arrangement.
2. Configuration Y reaches an acceptable level of performance particularly if the airplane's balance permits use of the 16^o sweep position. Evidence available is insufficient to determine this point with certainty. Loiter performance is improved with the reduced weight. The cost assigned by General Dynamics for this configuration is so high, however, that more analysis is required of this and other alternatives before firm program decisions can be made.
   



10. Recommendations are difficult in this program due to the constraints imposed by other than technical considerations. Some of the factors which should be considered in reaching a final decision are noted below:
    



1. The cost effectiveness of the F-111B as reported in enclosure (4) showed a slight advantage over the F-4 for fleet air defense on an overall basis. The marked increase in F-111B costs degrade this picture. The same analysis further shows that the replacement of two squadrons of F-4s by one F-111B squadron, as currently contemplated in force level planning, actually decreases the fighter effectiveness of a carrier. The cost effectiveness is, of course, even more drastically reduced. There is obviously no margin in the F-111B for solutions such as reducing the missile load, or reducing the fuel load, as has been proposed on occasion.
2. Although the "Y" design is more attractive than the other alternatives suggested, there is no assurance that it is the best solution available. No comprehensive design study has yet been done on a fighter to meet only the Navy SOR. It has been known that Air Force Lo-Lo-Hi and other requirements had imposed substantial penalties. Studies should be made in sufficient depth that reliable cost data can be provided in addition to engineering information. Certainly, a preferred solution should be available as a standard of comparison.
3. McDonnell has had improved versions of the F-4 under study for some time. Their preliminary results will be available shortly.