Exhibit VF-7. (Retyped)

AIR-506:GS

27 FEB 1967

Subj: Lessons Learned in the Management of the F-111 Program

1. The referenced memoranda are typical of the F-111 program and indicate clearly that while there are lessons that could be learned from the program it is unlikely that they will. Note that:



1. Reference (a) states that SECDEF has asked SECNAV for a listing of lessons learned from the F-111 program, and encloses a starter list of six items. Deadline for submission to SECNAV is given as 8 February.
2. In reference (b), PM-2 forwards reference (a) to NASC and CNM and requests additional items be forwarded to him for transmittal to ASN(R&D). (Five days before SECNAV deadline). PM-2 also announced an independent study on the same subject with a target date of 15 March for submission to CNM.
3. Reference (c) requests submittal of additional items, background and examples to AIR-103 by 24 February, who is then to transmit them to PM-2 by 28 February. (20 days after SECNAV deadline)
4. A copy of the references reached me on 23 February. A draft copy of a proposed AIR-05 reply reached AIR-503 and AIR-530 on 24 February. A deadline of 1000, 27 February was given.



2. It is not clear after reviewing the references whether an item list is still desired for SECNAV or whether the more detailed problem discussion is desired for PM-2. The latter is apparently to be done in the current management style of listing problems, alternative solutions with their pros and cons and finally some recommendations. The effort required appears far greater than is warranted, and I will not attempt to comply. The mere listing of "Lessons," however, is not unreasonable and will be attempted below.



3. It is obvious that there will be no agreement on the "lessons" that the various levels of technical and management responsibility have, or should have, learned from the F-111 program. The view upward from the working level will be different then that of SECDEF. The six "lessons" listed as starters by the Secretarial level, for example, have long been known by those experienced in the art of airplane development. All of them have been considered, debated, and/or used in other development programs. Such experience was not accepted by the F-111 decision makers. The basic "lesson" was expressed by Santayana as "Those who fail to heed history are doomed to repeat it."



4. Other lessons:



1. Initiate joint programs only after obtaining the concurrence of all involved services as to technical feasibility.
2. Keep technical decisions at a level where all the issues involved are known and appreciated.
3. Schedule adherence is no way to apply pressure to a contractor to meet technical commitments.
4. No amount of management attention alone can solve technical problems.
5. Problems must be admitted and identified before solutions can be found.
6. A "Fixed Price" contract is anything but fixed price when specifications are not firm for the full scope of the contract.
7. The reliability of study results, committee prognostications, and service predictions should be judged on the basis of the past performance of the predictors in the particular specialized field under investigation. (While all predictions were on the optimistic side, some have been shown to be grossly so.)
8. Determine the rules of the game before getting involved in any joint venture with other services or DOD.



5. The primary lesson for the future in Navy dealings with OSD and the USAF would appear to be to avoid compromise of a Navy position, despite controversy which might ensue. Strong technical positions invariably have been weakened by the Navy management chain in an attempt to not offend another part of the Defense Department. This may have contributed to some of the poor decisions made in the program.



6. There is little doubt but that the F-111 has been the most over-managed program in our aircraft development history. Unfortunately, the management techniques, organization, and theories of the Air Force are being accepted as desirable or mandatory by both OSD and the Navy despite their demonstrated lack of success. Invariably, the Air Force has applied greater numbers of people and pages of documentation to all facets of the development game. The efficiency of the operation has been as low as its effectiveness.



7. No one program has demonstrated so well the adage, "you want it bad, you get it bad." This applies to this memorandum.

                                                                           G. A. Spangenberg

Copy to:AIR-103, AIR-5102, AIR-510, PM-2

[ed: There was an attachment called the Variable Lot Pricing Graph included with this]